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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
CFO TURNOVER, FIRM’S DEBT-EQUITY CHOICE AND INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
by 
Muhammad Bakhtear Talukdar 
Florida International University, 2016  
Miami, Florida 
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Kannan Raghunandan, Co-Major Professor 
The CEO and CFO are the two key executives of a firm. They work cohesively to 
ensure the growth of the firm. After the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, 
the importance of CFOs has increased due to their personal legal obligation in certifying 
the accuracy of financial statements. Only a few papers such as Mian (2001), Fee and 
Hadlock (2004), and Geiger and North (2006) focus on CFOs in the pre-SOX era. 
However, a vacuum exists in research focusing exclusively on CFOs in the post-SOX era. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to delve into a comprehensive investigation of the CFOs.  
More specifically, I answer three questions: a) does the CEO change lead to the CFO 
change? b) does the CFO appointment type affect the firm’s debt-equity choice? and c) 
does the CFO appointment affect the firm’s information environment? 
I use Shumway’s (2001) dynamic hazard model in answering question ‘a’. For 
question ‘b’, I use instrumental variable (IV) regression under various estimation 
techniques to control for endogeneity. For part ‘c’, I use the cross sectional difference-in-
vii 
 
difference (DND) methodology by pairing treatment firms with control firms chosen by 
the propensity scores matching (PSM).   
I find there is about a 70% probability of CFO replacement after the CEO 
replacement. Both of their replacements are affected by prior year’s poor performance. In 
addition, as a custodian of the firm’s financial reporting, the CFO is replaced proactively 
due to a probability of restatement of earnings. I find firms with internal CFO hires issue 
more equity in the year of appointment than firms with external hires. The promoted CFO 
significantly improves the firm’s overall governance which helps the firm obtain external 
financing from equity issue. However, I find that CFO turnover does not significantly affect 
the firm’s information environment. To ensure that my finding is not due to mixing up of 
samples of good and distressed firms together, I separated distressed firms and re-ran my 
models and my finding still holds.  
This dissertation fills the gap in the literature with regards to CFOs and their post 
SOX relationship with the firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER                                                                                                                            PAGE 
1. DOES THE CEO CHANGE LEAD TO THE CFO CHANGE? ...................................1 
1.1.Introduction ..............................................................................................................1 
1.2.Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses ................................................6 
1.3.Data and Sample Selection .......................................................................................7 
1.4.Methodology ............................................................................................................8 
1.4.1. Main Model. .................................................................................................8 
1.4.2. Alternative Model. ..................................................................................... 10 
1.5.Results... ................................................................................................................. 12 
1.6.Conclusion .............................................................................................................18 
2. DOES THE CFO APPOINTMENT TYPE AFFECT THE FIRM’S DEBT-EQUITY 
CHOICE? ..................................................................................................................... 32 
2.1.Introduction ............................................................................................................32 
2.2.Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses .............................................. 38 
2.3.Data and Sample Selection ..................................................................................... 39 
2.4.Methodology .......................................................................................................... 41 
2.4.1. Main Model. ............................................................................................... 41 
2.4.2. Alternative Model. ..................................................................................... 46 
2.5.Results ... ...............................................................................................................47 
2.6.Conclusion .............................................................................................................54 
3. DOES THE CFO APPOINTMENT AFFECT THE FIRM’S INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT? ...................................................................................................... 64 
3.1.Introduction ............................................................................................................64 
3.2.Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses .............................................. 69 
3.2.1. Information Environment and CFO Change .............................................. 69 
3.2.2. Information Environment Proxies.............................................................. 72 
3.2.3. Testable Hypotheses .................................................................................. 72 
3.3.Data and Sample Selection ..................................................................................... 74 
3.4.Methodology .......................................................................................................... 76 
3.5.Results... .................................................................................................................82 
3.6.Conclusion .............................................................................................................92 
 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................116 
APPENDIX.....................................................................................................................122 
VITA................................................................................................................................128 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
TABLE                                                                                                                                  PAGE 
 
1.1 Distribution of CEO and CFO Turnover .....................................................................22 
1.2 Distribution of CEO and CFO turnover category (2005-2014) ................................... 23 
1.3 Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample)............................................................................. 24 
1.4 Descriptive Statistics (CEO-CFO Changed Years)  .................................................... 25 
1.5 Calculation of F-score following Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011).................. 26 
1.6 Correlations. ................................................................................................................. 27 
1.7 Estimations from Logit Model .....................................................................................28 
1.8 Estimation from Fixed Effect Logit Model .................................................................29 
1.9 Estimation from Dynamic Hazard Model ....................................................................30 
2.1 Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................56 
2.2 Correlations ..................................................................................................................57 
2.3 Debt-equity Choice by Internal and External CFOs ....................................................58 
2.4 T-test on Other Variables between Two Groups .........................................................59 
2.5 Effect of Internal CFO on Governance and Equity Issue ............................................60 
2.6 Internal CFO and Firm Equity Choice .........................................................................61 
2.7 Internal CFO and Information Asymmetry..................................................................62  
2.8 Internal CFO and Firm Equity Choice (Probit Model)  ...............................................63 
3.1 Definition of Information Environment Variables ......................................................97 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................100 
3.3 T-test of Information Environment Variables ............................................................102 
3.4 Expected Signs ...........................................................................................................103 
x 
 
3.5 Multivariate Analysis (All Firms)  .............................................................................104 
3.6 Multivariate analysis (-5 years)  ................................................................................106 
3.7 Multivariate analysis (-4 years)  ................................................................................107 
3.8 Multivariate analysis (-3 years)  ................................................................................108 
3.9 Multivariate analysis (-2 years)  ................................................................................109 
3.10 Multivariate analysis (-1 year)  ................................................................................110 
3.11 Multivariate Analysis for Internal CFO Appointment (All Firms)  .........................111 
3.12 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (All Firms) ........................112 
3.13 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (-5 Years)  .........................113 
3.14 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (-4 Years)  .........................114 
3.15 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (-3 Years)  .........................115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
FIGURE                                                                                                                                PAGE 
 
1.1 Spike of CFO Turnover following CEO Turnover ......................................................20 
1.2 CEO & CFO Turnover ................................................................................................. 21 
2.1 Why I have defined internal CFO as having year-difference is >=2 years .................. 55 
3.1 Research Design........................................................................................................... 95 
3.2 Comparison between institutional holding (block holding by outsiders) of a group  
of firms in 1996-2001 with institutional holding of the same group of firms in  
2005-2011......................................................................................................................96 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: DOES THE CEO CHANGE LEAD TO THE CFO CHANGE? 
1.1 Introduction 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the central point of many governance and 
earnings management literature1. Some research looks into the dynamic relationship 
between the CEO and the CFO (Chief Financial Officer), due to the growing importance 
of the CFO as second in command in terms of financial reporting after the adoption of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 20022. Coyne and Coyne (2007) find that one out of four 
proxy-level executives had to leave the firm within a year of the CEO taking charge 
following SOX. Moreover, Fee and Hadlock (2004) find that non-CEO departure spiked 
significantly after the new CEO took office (within six months) in their sample period. 
They argue that the board and/or the new CEO cleans out the old management team fairly 
quickly when the old CEO is dismissed. My objectives in this essay are twofold. First, the 
purpose is to investigate whether the pre-SOX finding on the CEO-CFO turnover relation 
(i.e., following the CEO turnover there is a spike of non-CEO turnover) remains in the post 
SOX.  Second, the aim is to investigate whether the CEO departure can be an opportune 
moment for the CFOs to take over his/her (earlier) boss’s position. The likelihood of 
accounting restatement and receiving adverse SOX 404 opinions depends on the ability of 
the CFO. Aier et al. (2005) show that restatement is negatively associated with the CFO’s 
                                                          
1 For example, see McAnally, Weaver, and Srivastava (2008), Graham and Harvey (2001), Parrino (1997), 
and Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, (2010). 
2 Hayes et al. (2002), and Fee and Hadlock (2004) take a broader perspective in modeling CEO and non-CEO 
manager turnover. 
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financial expertise. Li et al. (2010) show that prior years’ adverse auditor opinion can be 
removed by hiring a CFO with better qualifications.  
Moreover, financial background is the most valued tenet to become the CEO. A 
Forbes magazine study shows that about 30% of the Fortune 500 CEOs spent the first few 
years of their careers in developing a strong background in finance3.  After the debacle of 
Enron (October 2001) and at the wake of WorldCom’s (June 2002) accounting fraud4, the 
US Congress passed the SOX in July 2002. Both the CEO and CFO of WorldCom escaped 
from the Congressional hearing, citing their Fifth Amendment rights. Section 302 of SOX 
separates the CEO and the CFO from the rest of the executive team and distinguishes them 
by assigning personal legal responsibility in ensuring the accuracy of financial statements5. 
Jiang et al. (2010) argue that “Because CFOs’ primary responsibility is financial reporting, 
CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings 
management (p. 513).” They show that “the magnitude of accounting accruals and 
likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to 
those of the CEO (p. 513).” The growing importance of the CFO in the organizational 
                                                          
3 Financial expertise is by far the most common early experience of CEOs, followed by sales and marketing. 
The full study is available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/12/05/the-path-to-becoming-a-
fortune-500-ceo/#5400b64b28c9. 
4 WorldCom mislabeled the current expenses (income statement item) of line-fees for accessing third parties’ 
telephone lines as the long-term assets (balance sheet item) and therefore, had shown inflated net income and 
increased assets. For the full story on WorldCom: The Accounting Scandal, please refer to: 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21253_08292002.pdf 
 
5 From section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, “The Commission shall, by rule, require, for each 
company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78m, 78o (d)), that the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or 
officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or 
submitted….” For the complete text please refer to: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf. 
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structure motivates me to look into the causal relation between the CEO and CFO 
turnover6.  
When a firm faces the need to implement a new strategy especially after a spell of 
poor performance, it replaces its current CEO to make a ‘turnaround’. New CEOs 
significantly change the status quo of current operations and bring massive changes into 
the firm’s policies and strategies. As found by Weisbach (1995), the probability of 
unprofitable divestment of acquisitions that were done at the time of previous CEOs 
increases significantly after a new CEO takes office.  Moreover, Huson et al.  (2004) find 
that firm performance prior to appointing a CEO deteriorates and improves after the 
appointment of a new CEO. Therefore, CEO change is an important event in a firm’s life, 
and it is worthwhile to see how non-CEO executives/managers are affected by such a 
change.  
Fee and Hadlock (2004) find that the association between CEO and non-CEO 
executive turnover is driven by the CEO departure followed by poor performance. 
However, performance alone cannot predict non-CEO executive departure. Moreover, they 
find when CEOs are replaced from the external labor market, the departure of non-CEO 
managers jumped within the first six months of such replacement. Fee and Hadlock use 
data from the 1990s and sample firms from the S&P 500 index. Their findings may be 
biased due to firm size because the S&P 500 only includes big firms in the index. Moreover, 
in their sample period, the CFO was not a big figure in the executive team; therefore, Fee 
and Hadlock (2004) do not distinguish the CFO vs. other executives. After SOX, the CFO 
                                                          
6 “Turnover,” “change,” and “replacement” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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has been getting more importance in the press as well as in academic literature.  A 
comprehensive analysis of the replacement of the CEO and CFO, the top two executives 
of the firm, and the reason(s) behind such replacement are an interesting phenomenon in 
corporate governance literature.  
There are only a few papers (Parrino, 1997; Mian, 2001; Fee and Hadlock 2004), 
which analyze non-CEO executive replacement surrounding CEO replacement. However, 
they differ broadly in their methodologies and dimensions in analyzing the relation 
between CEO turnover and non-CEO departures. For example, in Mian’s (2001) paper, a 
t-test between CFO turnover ‘before’ and ‘after’ CEO replacement establishes a clear 
association between CEO change and CFO replacement. In addition, Parrino (1997) 
compares forced and voluntary turnover of former CEOs with replacement from inside the 
organization (via promotion) and outside the organization. Like Mian (2001), he employed 
a t-test between two proportions and concluded that in the case of forced turnover, outside 
replacement is evident. Unlike Mian (2001) and Parrino (1997), Fee and Hadlock (2004) 
employed multinomial logit model and from related coefficients, they derived the implied 
probability, which produces a percentage of an event happening. For example, they find in 
the normal case (defined as “in the case when CEO is not fired”) the non-CEO manager 
turnover rate is 9.28%, however, this rate jumps to 21.03% if the CEO leaves the office 
last year or this year for reasons (or the CEO is fired) other than health, death, corporate 
control transactions, and pursuit of their career to other companies. For only forced 
turnover, the corresponding rates are 2.85% and 13.50%, respectively. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, their findings are based on S&P 500 firms, and the sample period is 
quite a long time ago (1993-1998).  
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I find that the CEO change causes the CFO change. There is approximately an 82% 
probability of CFO replacement after the CEO has been replaced. There is about a 69% 
probability of CFO turnover when the CEO is replaced due to prior years’ poor 
performance. However, this rate jumps to 79% when there is both CEO replacements due 
to poor performance and a likelihood of accounting restatements. These are the results from 
Shumway’s (2001) Dynamic Hazard Model. As an overseer of a firm’s financial reporting, 
the CFO is replaced proactively due to a probability of the restatement of earnings. I use 
F-score (see Dechow et al. 2011) to calculate the likelihood of accounting restatement. I 
use various specification and estimation techniques in the robustness process. I use logit 
model in this study. Also, I use the dynamic hazard model and the firm and year fixed 
effect logit model using all years (including both the CEO-CFO and non-CEO-CFO change 
years). My findings hold across all these various models. 
I contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, in addition to re-confirming 
the pre-SOX finding that CEO turnover causes non-CEO turnover, I show that CEO 
resignation can be a career opportunity for the CFOs. Second, relative to existing literature, 
my study is based on a newer data set and involves the post-SOX era. Third, while previous 
studies drew conclusions based on event study or t-statistic, I use an advanced model with 
strong probabilistic inference ability to predict the CFO change surrounding the CEO 
change. Indeed, the validity of the statistical conclusion based on t-statistic may sometimes 
be confounding as argued by Soyer and Hogart (2012) “… There was widespread 
confusion in the interpretation of statistical results, due to a confounding of the concepts 
of statistical and economic or substantive significance. Too many results depended on 
whether the t- or other statistics exceeded arbitrarily defined limits (p. 697),” (see also 
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McCloskey and Ziliak [1996]). Finally, I focus on the CFO and CEO turnover relationship 
under various action categories: appointment, dismissal and resignation. The importance 
of the CFO as the second person in charge is increasing day by day, thus, focusing CFO 
and CEO turnover relationship and modeling it through the accurate probabilistic inference 
ability adds value to the existing literature.  
1.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Mian (2001), Parrino (1997), and Fee and Hadlock (2004) add to the design of my 
research questions. Since the CEO is the main person to evaluate the performance of non-
CEO executives, it is natural to expect when the CEO is replaced, he or she brings changes 
to the team they will be working with. Thus, my first hypothesis deals with the central 
question of my research: whether CEO replacement brings change to his/her CFO? 
Hypothesis-1: The CEO change leads to the subsequent CFO change within a year. 
Forced versus voluntary departures are interesting dimensions of executive 
turnover research (see Hayes et al., 2002, Parrino, 1997; Jalal and Prezas, 2012). In the 
cases of a CEO’s voluntary turnover (such as resignation), the CFO may have an 
opportunity for a career jump and may take over his/her previous boss’s position (CEO). 
In the cases where CEOs are ousted (due to dismissal or employment ceased) from their 
positions, it can be expected that the firm may also want to remove the second-in-command 
in terms of financial reporting, the CFO. Hazarika et al. (2012) show that forced turnover 
of CEOs is positively related with the firm’s earnings restatement. In addition, they find 
that earning management is positively related with the CFO’s forced removal. Therefore, 
in the case of earning restatements, firms may fire either the CEO or CFO or both. I posit 
that, 
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Hypothesis-2A: Voluntary turnover of CEOs creates a career opportunity for CFOs. 
Hypothesis-2B: Involuntary turnovers of CEOs instigate involuntary turnovers of 
CFOs. 
1.3 Data and Sample Selection 
I take CEO and CFO turnover data from AuditAnalytics7 (AA). Variables used for 
calculating F-score (Dechow et al., 2011) are taken from COMPUSTAT. Stock market 
returns data are collected from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices). Although 
AA shows that it has data since 1999, there is only a few observations in 1999-2002, 10 
CEO turnovers and 4 CFO turnovers. In 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission was finalizing the rulings regarding 8-K filings and the effective date of the 
Final Rule8 was August 23, 2004. Moreover, data are still being collected on firms that 
have fiscal year ended in the later part of 2015. Therefore, I excluded 2004 and 2015.  My 
sample period covers 2005-2014, a decade of full-year data. Following accounting and 
finance literature, I excluded firms from regulated and financial industries (SIC 4900-4999 
and 6000-6900) and excluded firms that have had total assets less than ten million. I label 
“Full Sample” for all firms including four major sub-samples: “Appointed,” “Resigned,” 
“Dismissed,” and “Employment Ceased.” I take these categories from AuditAnalytics 
which define them as follows: 
Appointed – indicates an engagement, appointment, election to Board, etc. 
                                                          
7 Please refer to http://www.auditanalytics.com/ 
8 Please refer to https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm 
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Dismissed – indicates a clear involuntary termination of employment or board 
service 
Resigned – indicates a voluntary departure. 
Employment Ceased – used when the filing is unclear as to whether the departure 
was voluntary or involuntary. 
I combined dismissed and employment ceased and label them as an involuntary 
turnover. Also, I label resigned as a voluntary turnover. The reason I included resigned as 
the subsample is sometimes firms do not want to fire a CEO or CFO but rather give them 
options to leave on their own. Firing is bad news for the fired executives as well as for the 
firms. Fired executives have a hard time finding a similar or better job. Gilson (1989) 
studies managers’ turnover from financially distressed firms. He finds it takes three years 
for the resigned managers to be employed by a similar firm. Also, the board does not want 
to associate itself with firing because of board members personal reputational risk (Taylor 
2010). I winsorize all variables (except dichotomous variables) at 1% and 99% level. 
The number of observations across models are different due to: a) using a sub-set 
of full sample, b) using more variables into some model than others, and c) not all variables 
having the data for the same years. I mention the number of observations (NOBS) used in 
the models in the result tables.   
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Main Model 
My objective in this essay is to predict the possibility of CFO turnover within a 
year surrounding CEO turnover. A firm qualifies to be included in the sample when it 
experiences CFO turnover in any particular year and/or CEO replacement. I am taking the 
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post-year of CEO replacement because Hayes et al. (2002) find that the association 
between CEO and non-CEO changes persists i.e., non-CEO managers are more likely to 
leave the company’s top management team even the year after CEO turnover. In line with 
Fee and Hadlock (2004), I use the following model to define CFO turnover as a function 
of the prior year’s CEO turnover with other specified controls: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡           (1) 
CFOturnoveri,t is CFO turnover for firm i in year t and CEOturnoveri,t-1 is CEO 
turnover for firm i in the prior year, respectively. Returni,t-1 is the “ﬁrm’s buy-and-hold 
stock return for the period ending at the start of the ﬁscal year during which the departure 
takes place less the value-weighted 2-digit compounded monthly industry return over this 
same period” (Fee and Hadlock, 2004, p.14). LnofSalesi,t is natural log of sales. The 
interaction term, CEOi,t*Returni,t-1 is for capturing the effects of CEO being fired for poor 
performance. Fscorei,t is the probability of the firm’s earnings restatements.  Because both 
sales and F-score are internal mechanisms for the board to monitor managers, I calculate 
both of them for the current year. Hazarika et al. (2012) show that boards tend to act 
proactively to discipline managers by firing managers before accounting restatement 
happens. F-score is calculated following Dechow et al. (2011) and using the logit 
regression which takes the following form:  
𝜋(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 + ∆𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + ∆𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + ∆𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + ∆𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑂𝐴 + ∆𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑢𝑡          (2) 
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In order to calculate the F-score, the predicted restatement from the above equation 
is divided by the unconditional probability9. Unconditional probability is defined by 
dividing the total number of accounting restatements by the total number of sample firms 
including the restated firms. An F-score equal to 1.00 means the firm has the same 
probability of restating earnings as unconditional probability. The higher F-score than 1.00 
means firms have higher probability of restating earnings. For example, an F-score of 2.00 
means firms have twice the probability of restating earnings compared to a randomly 
selected firm from the sample. The variable definitions are given in the appendix. 
I use the logit regression for equation (1). Also, I use the (firm and time) fixed effect 
logit regression. Both the logit regression and the fixed effect logit regression give an 
estimated probability effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. However, 
the latter model adjusts for variability due to time and variability caused by changes in the 
firm characteristics over time.  I use both specifications for all firms and three sub-samples.  
1.4.2 Alternative Model 
Like extant research, I use the logit model in which the dependent variable is 
dichotomous (taking a 0 or 1 as response). However, Shumway (2001) shows that a static 
logit model is not a better predictor model, especially when data are time series and a firm’s 
characteristics change over time. Therefore, he suggests a more dynamic hazard model. A 
static logit model only considers the firm-year of the event, whereas a hazard model 
considers each firm year observation. Therefore, it is more efficient than logit (or 
multinomial choice model) in out-of-sample forecasts. Davidson et al. (2013) use a more 
                                                          
9 Dechow et al. (2011) scale their negative predicted restatement by using EXP(predicted restatement)/1+ 
EXP(predicted restatement). However, in my case, all the predicted values are positive and therefore, I did 
not have to use the conversion.  
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dynamic hazard model and point out two major benefits of the model over a static logit 
model: a) it overcomes sample selection biases which may arise from only one non-
randomly selected observation per firm, and b) incorporates the time-varying nature of the 
predictor variables. The following discussion is heavily based on Shumway (2001) who 
first shows the superiority of a hazard model over a (static) logit model. 
A logit model is from a group of static models which has the following likelihood 
function, 
ℒ = ∏ 𝐹(𝑡𝑖, 𝑥𝑖; 𝜃)
𝑦𝑖[1 − 𝐹(𝑡𝑖, 𝑥𝑖; 𝜃)
1−𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
] 
Where, F is a cumulative density function (CDF) which corresponds to f(t,x;θ). The 
hazard model requires a few more definitions than the above function. The survivor 
function (gives the probability of surviving up to time t) and the hazard function (gives the 
probability of failure at time t conditional on surviving up to time t) take the following 
forms, respectively: 
𝑆(𝑡, 𝑥; 𝜃) = ∑ 𝑓(𝑗, 𝑥; 𝜃)
𝑗<𝑡
 
      , 
𝜑(𝑡, 𝑥; 𝜃) =
𝑓(𝑡, 𝑥; 𝜃)
𝑆(𝑡, 𝑥; 𝜃)
 
The hazard model has the following likelihood function,  
ℒ = ∏ 𝜑(𝑡𝑖, 𝑥𝑖; 𝜃)
𝑦𝑖𝑆(𝑡𝑖, 𝑥𝑖; 𝜃)
1−𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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“The hazard model can incorporate time-varying covariates by making x depend on 
time” (Shumway, 2001, p. 105).  
To calculate implied probability or odds for each co-variate I use the following 
formula10,  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
1 + 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
 
In addition, I also run the firm and time fixed effect model to purge out any effect 
that is due to the firm’s characteristics and time. 
1.5 Results 
Table 1.1 reports the distribution of CEO and CFO turnovers. In total, there were 
9,773 turnover events. CFO turnovers were 5,499 and 4,337 CEO turnovers. In all years, 
CFO turnover is more than CEO turnover. The highest turnover happened in 2007: 496 
CEO turnovers and 708 CFO turnovers. The year 2006 had the second highest for both the 
CEO turnover (485 turnovers) and the CFO turnover (698 turnovers). Figure 1.1 shows the 
spike of the CFO turnover following the CEO turnover for “Full Sample” and under 
“Voluntary Turnover” and “Involuntary Turnover.” Figure 1.2 shows the CEO-CFO 
turnover distribution. CFO turnover followed the CEO turnover in the sample period: 2005-
2014. Financial crisis had a greater toll on CFOs than CEOs as more CFOs were replaced 
or laid off during 2008-2009 (noticeable decline in CFO line from 2008 to 2009).  
                                                          
10 The same conversion formula is used by Spruance et al. (2004). See Antimicrobial Agents and 
Chemotherapy, Aug. 2004, p. 2787–2792. 
 
(6) 
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Table 1.2 includes turnover categories by “action” field in AuditAnalytics (AA). 
The “action” field categorizes all turnover events by recent change that has taken place or 
will take place in the CEO or CFO title. AA defines it as follows: 
“This field describes the action that describes the change that has taken or will take place, 
i.e., an appointment, resignation, dismissal, etc. For the most part, the action that is 
indicated is what is stated in the filing, unless it is very clear that the filing says one thing, 
but means another. For instance, if the filing states that a director’s resignation from the 
board was required as part of a settlement to end a lawsuit, the action would be graded as 
a dismissal.”     
The most action category is “appointed” (frequency is 5,962 and 58.30% of total 
turnover events), and the least are “declined re-election” or “nominated.” In my sample, I 
excluded generic retirements and those deceased, which are 687 events and 23 events, 
respectively. In my sub-sample analysis, I use “Resigned” as voluntary turnover and 
“Dismissed” and “Employment Ceased” together as involuntary turnover which have 
2,650 and 644 (=150+494) events, respectively.  
Table 1.3 reports the descriptive statistics using all firm-year data including CEO 
and CFO turnover years. For a firm that has experienced CEO and/or CFO replacement in 
any year in 2005-2014 is included in the sample assuming the firm was established before 
2005. There is 10 years of data. The buy-and-hold market adjusted return is positive 
(=12.10%), however, the interaction of return with the CEO is negative (=-0.90%), which 
means that CEO replacement is associated with poor firm performance.  RSST accruals 
stand for Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, Tuna accruals. I follow Richardson et al. (2005) to 
calculate the accruals. Soft assets are the ratio of total assets, except PP&E, cash, and cash 
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equivalents to total assets. About half (=mean is 0.49) of the firm’s assets are composed of 
soft assets. Change in number of employees is negative (=-5.00%), which implies that over 
the time firms reduced their employee base. Lease dummy and issue are indicator variables. 
Lease dummy takes a value of 1.00 for existence of operating lease, and issue takes a value 
of 1, if the firm issues either debt or equity in the sample period. In both cases, over 70% 
of the firms have existence of operating lease and issue either debt and/or equity. Year is a 
trend variable, which takes a value of 0-10 (e.g., 2005-2005=0 and 2014-2005=10).  
Table 1.4 reports the descriptive statistics only for the firms which experienced 
either CEO or CFO or both turnovers. These are sub-section of firms reported in Table 1.5. 
Overall, the results are similar with few exceptions: a) the likelihood of restatement is 
higher (1.02 versus 0.98), b) the changes in ROA is more negative (-1.30% versus -0.50%), 
and c) the proportion of firms with operating lease obligations is higher (91% versus 78%). 
Table 1.5 reports one of the key variables I use in my study—F-score. F-score is a 
parsimonious way of identifying the probability of a firm to restate its earnings. I take this 
measure from Dechow et al. (2011). Panel-A reports the maximum likelihood estimation 
from logistics regression. The important determinants for earnings restatement are accruals 
(like Dechow et al., I take accruals from Richardson et al. 2005), soft assets, changes in 
cash sales, changes in employees, existence of operating lease, existence of debt or equity. 
Panel-B reports the overall model fit statistics using three information criteria: AIC 
(Akaike information criterion), SC (Schwarz criterion) and -2*log likelihood ratio. My 
results are similar to that of Dechow et al. (2011), except my change in cash sales is 
negatively impacting restatement, whereas in the reference paper of Dechow et al. (2011) 
it is positive. In both cases, intercept is negatively significant. The three criteria tell us the 
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validity of the covariates used in the logistic regression. AIC and -2*log likelihood ratio 
are lower when covariates are added to the intercept, which implies that the covariates 
significantly (refer to Panel-C) improve the model. Generally speaking, information 
criteria are used to pick the best model among competing models.  
Table 1.6 reports correlations between the variables both dependent and 
independent. I am specifically interested in the correlation between last year’s CEO 
turnover and this year’s CFO turnover. The correlation between these two variables is 
0.246 and significant at <0.0001 level. Moreover, earlier research shows that poor 
performance is responsible for firing managers. I use last year’s industry adjusted returns11 
for poor performance and multiplied it by this year’s CEO turnover. The product has a 
significant positive correlation (=0.026 significant at <0.0001 with the CFO turnover, 
which means that both CEO and CFO can be replaced for the poor performance. F-score 
is a probabilistic estimate for accounting restatement. It has a positive correlation (= 0.067 
significant at 0.0001) with CFO turnover, which means that the higher the probability of 
accounting restatement, the higher the chance that the CFO would be replaced.  
Table 1.7 includes the output from logit model. The second column includes all the 
firm-year irrespective of the categories. Column 3 and 4 report subsample analysis for 
voluntary (=resigned) and involuntary (=dismissed and employment ceased) turnover 
category, respectively. The dependent variable in all three settings is CFO turnover (=all 
categories) for this year, voluntary (=resigned) for this year, and involuntary (=dismissed 
and employment ceased) for this year. The variable of interest is the prior year’s CEO 
                                                          
11 Return is defined as “ﬁrm’s buy-and-hold stock return for the period ending at the start of the ﬁscal year 
during which the departure takes place less the value-weighted 2-digit compounded monthly industry return 
over this same period (Fee and Hadlock 2004, p.14).” 
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turnover. In “Full Sample” and “Voluntary Turnover” models, the prior year’s CEO 
turnover significantly affects this year’s CFO turnover. The coefficient for the CEOt-1 is 
significant and negative for the voluntary (=resigned) turnover. This means that firms most 
probably have a succession plan for the leaving CEOs and they prepare CFOs to take over. 
The CEO resignation is a career opportunity for the CFO. Like correlation, the interaction 
term (=CEOt*returnt-1) has a significant positive affect on the CFO turnover. Fee and 
Hadlock (2004) use this variable and show that for negative performance, CEOs are 
penalized before any other executive.  
F-score implies the likelihood of accounting restatement has a positive impact on 
CFO turnover, which means the higher this likelihood the higher the probability of 
turnover. It is significant and positive (t-value=10.00) which implies that as a second-in-
command in financial reporting, CFOs are penalized. Year is negatively related with CFO 
turnover. For new firms, it is difficult to fire and replace executives. Moreover, there is not 
enough history to evaluate an executive performance.  
Table 1.8 is similar to “Full Sample” in Table 1.7. I use firm and year fixed effect 
logit model. After controlling for time and firm characteristics, the prior year CEO turnover 
still significantly determines the CFO turnover. CEO turnover has a t-value of 25.16 and 
is significant at less than 1%. Among other variables, prior year’s return and the product 
of prior year’s return with CEO turnover is significant. The prior year’s return has a 
negative impact on the CFO turnover decision. However, when the CEO is replaced for the 
prior year’s poor performance (=CEOt*returnt-1), there is a severe consequence on the CFO 
turnover. For example, t-value for the prior year return is -2.28, whereas t-value for the 
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interaction term is 9.24. The mean of the interaction term is negative (=-0.90%) which 
justifies the fact of penalizing both CEOs and CFOs for the poor performance.  
Table 1.9 includes the output from the hazard model. Originally used in cancer 
treatment, this model dynamically uses every piece of available information and updates 
the outcome variable. In my case, the model essentially uses all the years including non-
CEO and non-CFO change years. Therefore, outcome from this model is more robust. In 
finance, Shumway (2001) first used it to forecast bankruptcy risk. Since then, many other 
researchers (Molina, 2002; Billett et al., 2011; Hazarika et al., 2012; Davidson et al., 2013) 
have used the hazard model. The output from this model is used to calculate the implied 
probability of CFO turnover conditioning on CEO turnover. I gradually build up the model. 
In “Model 1,” I use last year’s CEO turnover, the prior year’s return, and the interaction 
term between them. In “Model 2,” I add the natural log of sales. In “Model 3,” I add the 
log of sales and F-score. The objective of the hazard model is to compute the very last 
column, probability rather than estimating any effect. Probability is calculated as the hazard 
ratio divided by (1+hazard ratio). In all three models, CEO turnover has at least 81% 
probability that the CFO will be replaced after a CEO replacement. CEO replacement due 
to a poor performance (represented by the interaction term) plays a significant role in CFO 
replacement (the minimum probability is 68%). It is to be noted that CEO turnover includes 
all possible reasons for replacement such as non-alignment with the board, scandals, 
conflict of interests, and poor performance etc. Poor performance is one of the many 
reasons. Therefore, it is reasonable to have CEO turnover with a higher probability in the 
general case and CEO turnover*Returnt-1 has a lower probability value. 
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 F-score or the probability of accounting earnings also plays a significant role in 
CFO replacement. As I mentioned earlier, a board is proactive in replacing the CEO or 
CFO, if there is a trace that these executives are going to misstate earnings. Hazarika et al. 
(2012) show that it does not matter whether managers inflate or deflate earnings or if they 
receive any sanction by SEC or restate earnings. The board acts proactively and fires the 
executive(s) who might be involved in earnings misstatement. In my sample, I use 
restatement for the current year to calculate F-score, which based on Hazarika et al.’s 
(2012) findings, are correctly used. All the variables used in the three models are significant 
at 1% or lower (see P>z values in the column 5), except the natural log of sales in Model-
2, which is significant at the 5% level. The model fit statistics are reported in the bottom 
rows of each model. All three models are overall statistically significant (refer to LR chi2, 
log likelihood and probability>chi2).   
1.5 Conclusion 
In this essay, I use a dynamic hazard model prescribed by Shumway (2001) which 
can produce much more accurate probabilistic inferences than a traditional (static) logit 
model. Moreover, in light of the growing importance of the role of CFO in the post-SOX 
era in corporate financial decision-making, I analyze his/her turnover relation with the 
CEOs. To my knowledge, there is no recent paper, especially after the SOX, which 
analyzes CEO-CFO relationship. It would be interesting if I could analyze both pre-and-
post SOX scenarios. However, the data limitation hindered me from doing so. 
Hazarika et al. (2012) show that both CEO and CFO have to leave the firm after an 
informal allegation of an earning misstatement is found by the firm’s internal audit 
department and before the managers are found guilty when the firm announces an 
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accounting restatement or sanctions by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at a 
later period. Nowadays, corporate boards are more proactive than reactive as they used to 
be. The reason I use likelihood of restatement (denoted by F-score) as opposed to 
restatement per se is to capture the board’s pro-activeness. Like Hazarika et al. (2012), I 
find consistent evidence of board pro-activism in replacing key executives due to poor 
performance and likelihood of earnings restatements. 
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Figure 1.1 Spike of CFO Turnover following CEO Turnover 
This figure shows the spike of CFO turnovers following the CEO turnover. In Full Sample, 
5,186 CFOs were replaced, following 3,001 CEO replacements in the sample period of 
2005-2014. In the case of both voluntary turnovers and involuntary turnovers, the 
increasing trend continued. The Voluntary Turnover includes resigned, whereas, 
Involuntary Turnover includes dismissed and employment ceased. In the opposite 
category, Remained, for Full Sample, 356 more CFOs remained in the position than CEOs. 
However, fewer CFO remained in the position following CEO involuntary and voluntary 
turnovers. The arrow indicates the spike of the CFO replacement following the CEO 
replacements. 
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Figure 1.2 CEO & CFO Turnover 
This figure shows the distribution of CEO and CFO turnover in the sample period (2005-
2014). The figure shows that CFO turnover follows the CEO turnover. Since 2009, the 
difference (in the figure, vertical distance) between CEO and CFO turnover shrunk. The 
financial crisis took a bigger toll on the CFO turnover than it did on CEO turnover. From 
2008 to 2009, there is an abrupt drop in the CFO turnover. Overall, CEO turnover follows 
a smoother path than CFO turnover.  
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Table 1.1 Distribution of CEO and CFO Turnover 
This table reports the turnover distribution for both CEOs and CFOs. Executive turnover 
happening for that year is represented by 1 and no turnover happening for that year is 0. 
The number for both CEO and CFO turnover at the same time can be found by subtracting 
CEO=0 from CFO=1. For example, in 2007, there are 13 (=708-695) cases in which both 
the executives are replaced. Relatively, a high number of turnover occurred during 2005-
2008. In all the years, CFO turnover is higher than CEO turnover.  
 CFO Turnover CEO Turnover 
Year 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
2005 453 648 1,101 644 457 1,101 
2006 475 698 1,173 688 485 1,173 
2007 483 708 1,191 695 496 1,191 
2008 463 665 1,128 659 469 1,128 
2009 398 460 858 452 406 858 
2010 363 443 806 440 366 806 
2011 384 442 826 435 391 826 
2012 397 460 857 456 401 857 
2013 429 472 901 467 434 901 
2014 429 503 932 500 432 932 
Total 4,274 5,499 9,773 5,436 4,337 9,773 
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Table 1.2 Distribution of CEO and CFO turnover category (2005-2014) 
This table reports the turnover categories of CEOs and CFOs in the sample period, 2005-
2014. The highest category is “appointed” which says the executive is appointed for the 
firm. “Resigned” is resignation. It includes both voluntary and involuntary resignation. 
Sometimes, the board does not want to fire CEOs or other key executives for personal 
reputation risk (Taylor 2010). “Dismissed” and “Employment Ceased” are considered as 
involuntary turnover. In my sample, I exclude “retired” and “deceased.” Without these two 
categories, there are 9,063 total turnover events. 
Turnover category Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Administrative Leave 6 0.06 6 0.06 
Appointed 5692 58.24 5,698 58.3 
Appointment Revoked/Not Accepted 2 0.02 5,700 58.32 
Deceased 23 0.24 5,723 58.56 
Declined Re-election 1 0.01 5,724 58.57 
Dismissed 150 1.53 5,874 60.1 
Employment Ceased 494 5.05 6,368 65.16 
Nominated 1 0.01 6,369 65.17 
Personal Leave 30 0.31 6,399 65.48 
Re-elected 16 0.16 6,415 65.64 
Resigned 2650 27.12 9,065 92.76 
Retired 687 7.03 9,752 99.79 
Retracted Resignation 8 0.08 9,760 99.87 
Returned to Position 13 0.13 9,773 100 
Turnover without “Deceased” and “Retirement” 9,063  
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Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. Current year’s 
CFO return is 9.50% and the prior year’s CEO turnover is 6.90%. Return is defined as 
“ﬁrm’s buy-and-hold stock return for the period ending at the start of the ﬁscal year during 
which the departure takes place less the value-weighted 2-digit compounded monthly 
industry return over this same period.” (Fee and Hadlock 2004, p.14). The average return 
is positive, 15.00%. The product of the prior year’s return and this year’s CEO turnover is 
negative (=-0.90%). F-score implies the probability of a firm’s earning restatement 
following Dechow et al. (2011). F-score=1 means the firm has the same unconditional 
expectation of accounting restatement. Unconditional expectation is calculated as the 
number of restated firms divided by the total firms (including restated firms) in the sample 
period. Values over 1.00 indicates the probability of restatement. On average, most of the 
firms have similar to unconditional expectation of restating earnings (F score is close to 
1.00). The firms that restated their earnings were 8.80%. Both change in ROA and change 
in employees are negative, which means during the sample period most of the firms had 
negative growth in earnings and also cut back on size (=number of employees). About 78% 
of the firms have future operating lease obligations and about 73% of the firms either issued 
debt or equity during the sample period (2005-2014).                                                                     
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CFO turnover 56,729 0.091 0.288 0.000 1.000 
CEO turnover 47,007 0.057 0.231 0.000 1.000 
Returnt-1  48,698 0.121 1.052 -0.949 7.249 
Ln of sales 52,227 5.655 2.438 -1.378 11.128 
CEOt* Returnt-1 48,698 -0.009 0.113 -0.628 0.528 
F-score 39,151 0.984 0.168 0.394 1.663 
Restatement 42,378 0.088 0.284 0.000 1.000 
RSST accruals 48,577 0.030 0.218 -0.718 0.813 
∆ in receivables 51,850 0.011 0.054 -0.172 0.236 
∆ in inventories 52,214 0.006 0.037 -0.130 0.173 
Soft assets 56,618 0.487 0.282 0.005 0.974 
∆ in cash sales 47,428 0.119 0.828 -3.190 5.266 
∆ in ROA 48,791 -0.005 0.155 -0.605 0.619 
∆ in employees 45,780 -0.050 0.390 -1.924 1.453 
Lease dummy 56,729 0.779 0.415 0.000 1.000 
Issue 56,729 0.731 0.443 0.000 1.000 
Year 56,729 4.374 2.884 0.000 9.000 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive Statistics (CEO-CFO Changed Years) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables related with the firms that 
experienced CEO or CFO or both turnovers. The current year’s CFO return is 54.20% and 
the prior year’s CEO turnover is 42.70%. Return is defined as “ﬁrm’s buy-and-hold stock 
return for the period ending at the start of the ﬁscal year during which the departure takes 
place less the value-weighted 2-digit compounded monthly industry return over this same 
period.” (Fee and Hadlock 2004, p.14). F-score implies the probability of a firm’s earning 
restatement following Dechow et al. (2011). F-score=1 means the firm has the same 
unconditional expectation of accounting restatement. Unconditional expectation is 
calculated as the number of restated firms divided by the total firms (including restated 
firms) in the sample period. Values over 1.00 indicates the probability of restatement. On 
average, firms experienced CEO or CFO change have higher F-score than the overall. For 
example, F score for all firms is 0.98 versus 1.02 for only CEO or CFO change firms. 
11.00% of the firms restated their earnings. Both change in ROA and change is employees 
are negative, which means during the sample period most of the firms had negative growth 
in earnings and also cut back on size (=number of employees). About 91% of the firms 
have future operating lease obligations and about 78% of the firms either issued debt or 
equity during the sample period (2005-2014). 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CFO turnover 9,571 0.542 0.498 0.000 1.000 
CEO turnover 7,030 0.427 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Returnt-1 8,921 0.113 1.192 -0.949 7.249 
Ln of sales 9,281 5.656 2.415 -1.378 11.128 
CEOt* Returnt-1 8,921 0.022 0.653 -0.925 4.820 
F-score 7,613 1.016 0.145 0.394 1.641 
Restatement 9,471 0.110 0.313 0.000 1.000 
RSST accruals 8,390 0.000 0.228 -0.718 0.813 
∆ in receivables 9,108 0.007 0.057 -0.172 0.236 
∆ in inventories 9,065 0.003 0.040 -0.130 0.173 
Soft assets 9,549 0.540 0.260 0.005 0.974 
∆ in cash sales 8,671 0.126 0.693 -3.190 5.266 
∆ in ROA 8,832 -0.013 0.178 -0.605 0.619 
∆ in employees 8,822 -0.039 0.393 -1.924 1.453 
Lease dummy 9,571 0.909 0.288 0.000 1.000 
Issue 9,571 0.778 0.416 0.000 1.000 
Year 9,571 4.183 2.918 0.000 9.000 
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Table 1.5 Calculation of F-score following Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) 
The following table provides the maximum likelihood estimation from logit regression. 
The dependent variable is actual restatement which takes a value of 1 if the firm announce 
accounting restatement in any particular year and 0 otherwise. RSST accruals is calculated 
following Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005). Dechow et al. (2011) show only 
the following variables (refer Model #2 in their paper) matter for determining the 
probability of accounting restatement. The model has the highest rate of correct 
classification (refer to p. 55-59) of restatement. Panel A reports the coefficient from the 
estimation. Panel B reports the information criteria. The log likelihood (-2 Log L), 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), and Schwarz criterion (SC) are reported in Panel B. 
AIC and -2 Log L are lower under “Intercept and Covariates” than under “Intercept Only,” 
which implies the validity of the covariates used in the model estimation. Panel C provides 
a hypothesis test result if the global beta is 0 (=null hypothesis). The failure to reject the 
null hypothesis implies that the variables used are well picked to estimate the probability 
for the firm’s accounting restatement. 
Panel A: Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > Chi-Sq. 
RSST accruals 1 0.040 0.057 0.492 0.483 
∆ in receivables 1 0.189 0.199 0.902 0.342 
∆ in inventories 1 0.427 0.275 2.409 0.121 
Soft assets 1 0.119 0.039 9.207 0.002 
∆ in cash sales 1 -0.003 0.015 0.046 0.830 
∆ in ROA 1 -0.054 0.068 0.631 0.427 
∆ in employees 1 0.071 0.029 6.148 0.013 
Lease dummy 1 0.174 0.034 25.705 <.0001 
Issue 1 0.117 0.025 22.792 <.0001 
Intercept 1 -1.669 0.039 1791.197 <.0001 
      
Panel B: Model Fit Statistics 
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and Covariates 
AIC 20410.06 20339.3 
SC 20418.5 20423.73 
-2 Log L 20408.058 20319.3 
   
Panel C: Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr. > Chi-Square 
Likelihood Ratio 88.757 9 <.0001 
Score 83.8813 9 <.0001 
Wald 85.6705 9 <.0001 
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Table 1.6 Correlations 
This table reports the correlations between variables. The correlation between CFO 
turnover and CEO turnover is 0.25, which is significant at less than the 1% level. The 
positive correlation implies that following a CEO turnover there is a strong possibility for 
a subsequent CFO turnover. The prior year’s poor performance can be a significant element 
to replace CEO and CFOs this year. For example, the interaction term, CEOt*Returnt-1 is 
significantly positively correlated with the current year’s CFO turnover. Current year’s 
sales are negatively correlated with the CFO turnover. The likelihood of earnings 
restatement designated by F-score is positively correlated with the CFO turnover, which 
means higher probability of accounting restatement will have higher CFO turnover. The 
italicized values are p-values for the respective correlation. 
 
CFO 
turnover 
CEO 
turnovert-1 
Returnt-1 
Ln of 
sales 
CEOt*Ret
urnt-1 
F-score Year 
CFO turnover 1.000       
        
CEO turnovert-1 0.246 1.000      
 <.0001       
Returnt-1 0.004 -0.005 1.000     
 0.352 0.311      
Ln of sales -0.004 0.018 -0.068 1.000    
 0.374 0.000 <.0001     
CEOt*Returnt-1 0.026 -0.129 0.210 0.035 1.000   
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    
F-score 0.067 0.042 -0.005 0.097 0.000 1.000  
 <.0001 <.0001 0.348 <.0001 0.969   
Year -0.032 0.009 -0.016 0.060 0.004 -0.132 1.000 
 <.0001 0.042 0.000 <.0001 0.326 <.0001  
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Table 1.7 Estimations from Logit Model 
This table reports the results from logit model using all firm-years (both event and non-
event years). Column 1 lists all the independent variables. Column 2 has output for “Full 
Sample” category which includes all the turnover varieties (refer to Table 2) excluding 
deceased and retired. Column 3 and 4 list output for “Voluntary Turnover” and 
“Involuntary Turnover.” Voluntary turnover includes “Resigned,” whereas, involuntary 
turnover includes “Dismissed” and “Employment Ceased” categories. CEO turnovert-1 
indicates the turnover of CEO in the previous year. It takes a value of 1 if there was a CEO 
turnover in the previous year and 0 otherwise. Returnt-1 is defined as the “ﬁrm’s buy-and-
hold stock return for the period ending at the start of the ﬁscal year during which the 
departure takes place less the value-weighted 2-digit compounded monthly industry return 
over this same period.” (Fee and Hadlock 2004, p.14) Ln of sales is the natural log of sales 
for the current year. CEOt*Returnt-1 is the product of the last year’s return (as defined 
before) and this year’s CEO turnover.  F-score is the probability of accounting restatement 
and is calculated following Dechow et al. (2011) [refer to Table 1.5]. Year is a time variable 
taking the value from 0 (start of the sample period, 2005) to 10 (end of the sample period, 
2014).  
Dependent variable: CFO turnover Full Sample 
Voluntary 
Turnover 
Involuntary 
Turnover 
CEO turnovert-1 1.913*** -0.457*** 0.010 
 (37.97) (-4.31) (0.05) 
Returnt-1 -0.056*** -0.308*** -0.058 
 (-2.60) (-5.27) (-0.62)    
Ln of sales -0.050*** -0.085*** -0.048 
 (-6.07) (-3.57) (-1.18)    
CEOt*Returnt-1 1.260*** 3.204*** 1.725*** 
 (8.98) (13.67) (4.57) 
F-score  1.217*** 0.168 0.970 
 (10.00) (0.48) (1.46) 
Year -0.039*** -0.031* 0.012 
 (-5.34) (-1.67) (0.33) 
Constant -3.080*** 1.066*** -0.649 
 (-22.99) (2.95) (-0.95)    
R-squared 0.066 0.095 0.035 
NOBS 32,464 1,917 574 
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Table 1.8 Estimation from Fixed Effect Logit Model 
This table reports the results from the firm and time fixed effect model using all firm-year 
data. My variable of interest, CEO turnovert-1 significantly (at less than 1%) positively 
affects the CFO turnover: negative performance increases the chance of CFO replacement, 
whereas positive performance increases the probability of remaining in the position. The t-
value is 11.42. The past year’s return significantly affects CFO turnover. The coefficient 
for CEOt*Returnt-1 is significant and positive, which means that if the CEO is replaced due 
to the prior year’s (negative) performance then the effect of the CFO turnover is positive.  
Dep. Variable: CFO 
turnover 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
CEO turnovert-1 1.617 0.064 25.16 0.000 1.491 1.743 
Returnt-1  -0.055 0.024 -2.28 0.023 -0.102 -0.008 
Ln of sales -0.042 0.046 -0.92 0.358 -0.132 0.048 
CEOt*Returnt-1 1.526 0.165 9.24 0.000 1.202 1.850 
F-score -0.105 0.227 -0.46 0.645 -0.550 0.341 
Firm fixed effect? Yes      
Year fixed effect? Yes      
Log likelihood -4,602.524      
LR Chi2 (13) 764.790      
Prob> Chi2 0.000      
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Table 1.9 Estimation from Dynamic Hazard Model 
This table provides the estimation results from Hazard Model using “Full Sample” and all 
year data. Model-1 is the base model. Additional variables are added in Model 2 and Model 
3. Ln of sales and ln of sales with F-score are added to Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. 
The second column reports the hazard ratio (HR) from maximum likelihood estimation. 
The last column, probability is calculated by dividing HR/(1+HR). This column provides 
the probability (effect) of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The 
probability provides the likelihood of hazard (in this case, turnover) conditional on the 
survival up until the replacement. In all three models, the prior year’s CEO turnover is a 
significant event to replace the current year’s CFO. In Model 3, in the presence of 
restatement probability and ln of sales, the most three significant variables are: prior year 
CEO turnover (=82% probability on CFO turnover), the CEO turnover for the prior year’s 
poor performance (CEOt*Returnt-1=68% probability on CFO turnover), and F-score (=79% 
probability on CFO turnover). 
Model #1 
Covariates 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Probability 
CEO turnovert-1 5.022 0.183 44.210 0.000 4.675 5.394 83.39% 
Returnt-1 0.914 0.016 -5.280 0.000 0.883 0.945 47.74% 
CEOt*Returnt-1 2.116 0.218 7.260 0.000 1.728 2.590 67.90% 
Year 0.000 0.000 -76.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 
Number of obs 
LR chi2(4) 
42,544     
65,449     
Log likelihood 44,342     
Prob > chi2 0.000     
Model #2 
Covariates 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Probability 
CEO turnovert-1 4.772 0.177 42.220 0.000 4.438 5.131 82.68% 
Returnt-1 0.907 0.016 -5.530 0.000 0.876 0.939 47.55% 
Ln of sales 0.984 0.006 -2.530 0.011 0.971 0.996 49.59% 
CEOt*Returnt-1 2.137 0.223 7.260 0.000 1.741 2.623 68.12% 
Year 0.000 0.000 -77.710 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 
Number of obs 
LR chi2(5) 
39,594 
 
   
63,737    
Log likelihood 43,456     
Prob>chi2 0.000     
      
Model #3 
Covariates 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Probability 
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CEO turnovert-1 4.513 0.182 37.390 0.000 4.170 4.884 81.86% 
Returnt-1 0.891 0.019 -5.540 0.000 0.855 0.928 47.12% 
Ln of sales 0.958 0.007 -5.610 0.000 0.944 0.973 48.93% 
CEOt*Returnt-1 2.231 0.254 7.060 0.000 1.785 2.788 69.05% 
F-score 3.854 0.440 11.810 0.000 3.081 4.820 79.40% 
Year 0.000 0.000 -70.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% 
Number of obs 
LR chi2(6) 
32,464 
 
   
53,900    
Log likelihood 36,808     
Prob>chi2 0.000     
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CHAPTER 2: DOES THE CFO APPOINTMENT TYPE AFFECT THE FIRM’S DEBT-
EQUITY CHOICE? 
2.1 Introduction 
The choice a firm makes between debt and equity is always puzzling. In the seminal 
paper on firm’s capital structure, Myers (1984) notes, “How do firms choose their capital 
structures? Again, the answer is we don’t know (p. 575).” He shows that firms aim for an 
optimal capital structure based on the benefits and costs of debt and firms try to work on 
any deviation from that optimal mix of debt and equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) show 
that firms follow a pecking order, i.e., prefer internal to external financing and debt to 
equity financing. In a recent paper, Fama and French (2005) show that firms no longer 
follow pecking order and the majority of firms issue equity. In addition, Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) show that firms consistently try to reach the optimal target debt ratio. However, due 
to the dynamic nature of a firm’s profitability and stock market activism, the target debt 
ratio changes over time. Firms have to consistently engage in adjusting capital structure 
activities, i.e., issue debt or equity, repurchase stocks and retire debt, to achieve an ever 
changing target (optimal) capital structure.  
The search for CFOs from the external labor market is costly and time consuming. 
Firms want to avoid the searching costs for a CFO if they can find a capable individual 
inside the organization. A recent study sponsored by Chicago Booth Executive Education, 
University of Chicago, reports that four out of five times, firms promote internals as 
CEOs12. Cremers and Grinstein (2008) find that 68% of the CEOs were former employees 
                                                          
12 It is a comprehensive study on the CEOs titled “CEO Succession 2000-2009: A Decade of Convergence 
and Compression.” A short description about the report, “Convergence and compression — these are the 
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of the same firm and 86% belonged to the same industry. For some reason, firms have to 
go for external hires. Compared to internally promoted CFOs, external CFOs have to take 
time to learn the culture of the organization, its financing, investment, and other policies.  
Inversely, internal hires have an edge over the external hires in terms of 
understanding the firm’s policies, maintaining the commitment to the investors, and 
furnishing timely information to the investors. The Chicago Booth (2010) study finds  
Insider candidates are naturally more knowledgeable about the company and the 
challenges and opportunities it confronts. They also tend to perform better and last 
longer, according to our research. Of the CEOs leaving office, insiders have 
produced superior regionally market-adjusted shareholder returns in seven of the 
last 10 years, averaging 2.5 percent; outsider-generated returns, in comparison, 
have averaged 1.8 percent (p. 6).  
Therefore, in terms of CFO hiring, unless it is really expected by the market to hire a new 
CFO from the external labor market, firms go for promoting incumbents as CFOs13.  
Nevertheless, hiring from an external source is more expensive than promoting 
inside the organization. Murphy and Zabojnik (2003, 2004) document that external hires 
cost 15.30% more than internally promoted CEOs14. The cost of hiring from the external 
                                                          
macro themes that emerge from our analysis of 10 consecutive years’ worth of detailed data on CEO 
succession among the world’s top 2,500 public companies. This rich database comprises 3,719 CEO turnover 
events globally.” For the full report, please refer to http://www.strategy-business.com/article/10208. 
13 Situations in which the market expects an external hire are if the firms receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion, 
if the firm’s current CFO consistently fails to meet analysts’ expectations or if the firm has been doing poorly 
for the last few years (Mian, 2001).   
14 As the authors document this premium has increased over time: 6.50% in 1970s, 17.20% in 1980s, and 
21.60% in 1990s. 
34 
 
labor market has increased over time. Taylor (2010) shows that replacing a CEO (who was 
fired) can cost at least $200 million to shareholders, and shareholder value is increased by 
3% if these (perceived) costs can be eliminated. The perceived costs associated with a new 
hire are due to entrenchment (or poor governance). Extant literature15 shows that when 
there is a forced turnover, firms usually hire from the external labor market. Instead, 
promoting someone from inside the organization can save the turnover costs.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that due to adverse selection (managers having 
better information than general investors) managers avoid issuing equity and forgo 
profitable project opportunities. The less adverse selection or information asymmetry 
motivates managers to issue equity rather than debt. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) show that 
managers issue equity when investors’ views and managers’ views are aligned in terms of 
project payoffs. Firms can reduce information asymmetry either by external certification, 
such as employing high quality auditors, or by internal mechanisms such as policies to 
share timely information with the investors. The ultimate responsibility lies with the 
management of firms on how much information they want to share with investors. Both 
the management leadership choice and the policies of the firm affect the extent of 
information asymmetry and ultimately affect the financing decision of the firm.  
An internal CFO, assuming that s/he has been with the firm at least for a year, 
knows the firm’s reporting policies better than an external CFO.  Chung et al. (2010) 
establish a relationship between a firm’s governance and information asymmetry. They 
show that good governed firms have less information asymmetry whereas poorly governed 
                                                          
15 Parrino (1997) finds that the real costs of firing a CEO is lower when firms can find a replacement in 
similar (homogeneous) industry. Also, Mian (2001) finds that investors expect an external hire when firms 
had few years of negative performance. 
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firms have more information asymmetry. They note “… poor governance gives rise to 
greater information asymmetry between the insiders (e.g., managers/controlling 
shareholders) and outside owners (p. 279).” If an internally promoted CFO is shown to 
improve a firm’s governance or equivalently reduce information asymmetry, then the firm 
will have greater incentive to issue equity. The relation between issuing equity and firm 
asymmetry is negative. In the absence of information asymmetry, firms no longer refuse to 
issue stock, and therefore, do not pass up valuable investment opportunities (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). 
The chief financial officer (CFO), being the overseer of the firm’s financial 
disclosure, can significantly contribute to reducing the information gap between firm and 
investors. Among other managers of the firm, CFOs carry an important role in determining 
corporate financial decisions after the chief executive officer (CEO). Geiger and North 
(2006) find that discretionary accruals significantly decreased surrounding new CFO 
appointments, and their finding is not driven by the concurrent CEO appointments. Thus, 
it is reasonable to say that CFOs do have their independent opinions in financial decision 
making. In addition, the CFO’s background16 matters in corporate investment and 
financing decisions. Firms can hire CFOs from two sources: a) they can promote someone 
qualified to become the CFO, and b) they can hire from the external labor market. The 
most likely incumbents for CFOs are treasurers, controllers, and principal accounting 
officers. Firms promote incumbents when there are no expectations from the stock market 
                                                          
16 Brettel et al. (2008) find that firms with overconfident CFOs have higher debt in their capital structure. 
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) show that overconfident CFOs use a lower discount rate to 
evaluate their cash flows, use more debt, invest more, pay lower dividends, and repurchase more shares. 
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to hire from the external labor market17. On the contrary, if the firms are meeting the 
expectations of investors by providing adequate and timely information and lessening the 
information asymmetry, firms tend to promote an incumbent as the CFO. The internal 
managers play a significant role in reducing information asymmetry, as noted by Myers 
and Majluf (1984), “They [managers] have an insider’s view of their organization and what 
it can and cannot do. This organizational knowledge is part of managers’ human capital; 
they acquire it as they work, by conscious effort as well as by trial and error (p. 196).” 
The internal CFOs have stronger incentives to approach the investors for financing 
within a year to take advantage of the news of his/her promotion to the CFO. As internal 
CFOs’ interests are better aligned with that of the investors, they would approach equity 
financing rather than debt financing. Equity financing is better when firms have a clear 
idea of the expected payoffs of the potential projects. Shareholders are the owners of the 
firms; they do not pose a threat of bankruptcy like debt holders do in case of the firm’s 
inability to pay the reward for capital provided. Debt holders need detailed information 
about potential projects before making the issue decision. Sharing detailed information of 
potential profitable projects with the third party is strategically disadvantageous to the 
firms. When internal CFOs with a good understanding of the project payoffs approach the 
owner-investors of the firm, s/he can expect to receive the funds without the fear of leaking 
the information to the firm’s competitors. Internal CFOs will be more inclined toward 
issuing equity than issuing debt. In addition, contrary to “pecking order18” theory, firms 
                                                          
17 Mian (2001) shows that when firms do not perform well for the last few years (he tested for the last five 
years), the market expectation is that there will be a CFO hire from the external labor market. 
 
18 Firms finance investments from retained earnings, then riskless debt, followed by risky debt and as the last 
resort, go for equity issue such as “financial duress” (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Dittmar and Thakor ,2007) 
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frequently issue equity. Fama and French (2005) notes 86% of their sample firms issue 
equity of some form during their sample period, 1993-2003. 
I find that internally promoted CFOs significantly issue equity relative to an 
external hired CFO. When an incumbent is promoted as the CFO, firms have a 20% higher 
probability of issuing equity than in the case of hiring an external CFO. I also find that 
younger, growth and lowly levered firms promote incumbents as CFOs. For example, the 
average age of the firms promoting internals as CFOs is 12.72 years, whereas for firms 
hiring external CFOs, it is 17.43 years (a statistically significant difference). Market to 
book ratio for internal hire firms is 2.30 and for external hire 1.97 (a statistically significant 
difference); the mean leverage ratio for internal hire firms is 0.33, and for external hire, it 
is 0.38 (again, a statistically significant difference).  
Potential endogeneity may be present because there are some unobserved firm 
characteristics or random shocks that may affect both firm’s choice of issuing equity and 
appointment of an internal as the CFO. I control for potential endogeneity by using 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. In addition to the most common IV estimator, 2SLS 
(two stage least squares) model, I also use maximum likelihood estimation and generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimators. Following a similar type of instrument by Balsam 
et al. (2016), I used industry CFO ratio as instrument and find that internal CFO 
appointment significantly affects the firm equity issue. Z-value for INTERNAL is 3.10 
(P<|z|=0.002). I also tested for the validity or the strength of the chosen instrument, which 
resulted in a partial F-value of 45.66 in the first-stage regression, ensuring that the chosen 
instrument is valid and strong.  
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I employ all the known factors found in the earlier research that affect capital 
structure decision of a firm. After controlling all these debt-equity choice variables, my 
findings hold. I also find some interesting phenomena of internal CFOs, which also help to 
explain a firm’s equity choice after the CFO turnover. Some of the findings are worth 
mentioning. First, I find younger and smaller firms promote incumbents as the CFO. Frank 
and Goyal (2009) notes that since 1990, more small firms go for equity financing. Second, 
I find profitable firms employ internal CFOs and firms with negative ROA employ external 
CFOs. This is consistent with Mian (2001) who finds a strong association between a firm’s 
negative operating performances and external CFO appointments.  Third, firms with high 
stock returns promote internals as CFOs. Hovakimian et al. (2004) show that firms with 
high stock returns have higher probability of issuing equity.  
2.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Information asymmetry arises because of the information gap between 
management and investors. Information asymmetry is a market friction, which can subdue 
the potential growth of the firms. If the market was frictionless, meaning that investors 
would have access to private or privileged information, then managers would invest the 
optimal amount, i.e., no over or under investment. If investors think that managers are 
trying to sell overpriced securities, then they will buy less or they will ask for a higher 
return (thus increasing cost of capital) in the form of discounts. In the earlier finance 
literature, equity was shown as the last resort of financing for firms, and firms only issue 
equity in extreme times or financial duress (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, Fama and 
French (2005) document that 86% of their sample firms issue equity of some form and 
firms neither issue equity at the time of financial duress nor repurchase equity when outside 
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demand is lower. They, as such, conclude that the pecking order of capital structure is no 
longer alive.  
Frank and Goyal (2009) test the pecking order theory in respect to American firms 
and find that external financing is much more significant than recognized in the literature, 
and equity is a significant component of external financing. I hypothesize that a CFO who 
is recently promoted within the firm with an expectation to add value to the company’s 
operation would be able to minimize the information gap between two parties and could 
facilitate the external financing by equity. The appointment of an able CFO who has 
worked for the firm, knows the firm’s operation in detail, has a good tie with the investors, 
and would take advantage of going for equity financing. Since s/he knows that s/he is 
implementing the investment or growth plans that are well thought by the current board, 
his or her only job is to make sure that information conveyed to investors regarding the 
project payoffs are transparent, timely, and complete. When companies have less 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, they go for equity (opposite to 
what pecking order theory19 predicts). Therefore, I posit: 
Hypothesis:  Firms that have recently promoted an incumbent to a CFO are more 
likely to issue equity as opposed to debt than firms that have hired a CFO from external 
labor markets. 
2.3 Data and Sample Selection 
I collect the firm-level data from COMPUSTAT. Return data and number of 
analysts are taken from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) and IBES 
                                                          
19 Myers (1984) first points out that due to adverse selection firms prefer internal finance to external finance 
and if firms have to go for external finance they prefer debt to equity because equity issue is cumbersome. 
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(Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System), respectively. Companies that are not covered by 
IBES are assumed not to be followed by any analyst (Chang et al. 2009). Following extant 
literature (see Ferris et al. 2013), I define external and internal CFO as follows: CFOs who 
are with the company at least for one year are labeled as INTERNAL and CFOs that are 
newly hired and with the company for less than a year are defined as external. I take all the 
firms in the EXECOMP database over the period of 1992-2014. I measure the tenure before 
becoming the CFO as the difference between the year at which s/he is hired by the firm 
and the year s/he is appointed as the CFO. For example, if a CFO is hired in 2007 (in the 
database shows up as CFO) and the year in which his or her name shows up for the first 
time is 2005, then s/he will be an internal CFO. The difference in this case is 2 years. 
However, the same CFO’s name shows up for the first time in 2007 and thus, the difference 
is 0 would be defined as external. In defining internal CFOs, when the year difference 
(tenure) is 1, then the case might be confounding. For example, if an employee is hired 
right before the reporting date, then right after the reporting date, s/he is promoted as the 
CFO and another employee in another firm is hired as a non-CFO employee and promoted 
to CFO right before the next year reporting. In both cases, they will be labeled as “internal.” 
However, the CFO in the first example is not really a true INTERNAL. As there is no 
available data source for me to verify this type of scenarios without specific appointment 
date, I excluded internal CFOs that have a year difference of one. By including all the 
internals that have a year difference of two or more, I make sure that a CFO who has 
promoted internally has served the company at least one year. Please refer to a hypothetical 
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scenario presented in Figure 1. My sample covers 1994-201420. I have included firm-years 
in which there is a CFO change and firms issued either debt or equity (according the 
definition given earlier). To exclude the effect of concurrent CEO turnover on equity issue, 
I dropped all the firm-years in which there were both CEO and CFO turnovers occurred. 
Finally, I have 1,045 firm-years, which meet all my sample selection criteria. The number 
of observations across models are different due to: a) using more variables into some model 
than others, and b) not all variables having the data for the same years. I mention the 
number of observations (NOBS) used in the models in the result tables. 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Main Model 
Taylor (2010) estimates CEO firings using the structural equation model. He shows 
that CEOs are rarely fired by the board because of the personal costs associated with it. 
The CEO firing puts the personal reputation of the board members at risk to be appointed 
for other boards. In order to minimize the risk, the board of a weakly governed firm would 
not fire a bad CEO. He shows that reduction of entrenchment equivalently improving 
governance mechanism can significantly increase the returns to shareholders. In the same 
line of thinking, I conjecture that an internal CFO improves a firm’s overall governance by 
reducing entrenchment. However, it is plausible that good governed firms appoint an 
internal as CFO. I use Bebchuk et al. (2008) e-index which is a parsimonious form of 
governance index developed by Gompers, Ishii and Metric (2003) and shows that only six 
                                                          
20 1992-1993 are not considered because of INTERNAL definition. Previous 2-year is needed to define 
INTERNAL.  
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provisions (out of 24 IRRC provisions21) matters for the firm value. Four of the six 
provisions deal directly with shareholder rights: staggered board, limits to shareholder 
amendments of the by-laws, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments. These are the primary powers shareholders have 
(Bebchuk et al. 2008). If a firm practices good governance, then the appointment of CFOs 
will enhance the value of the shareholders by reducing any form of entrenchment. I proxy 
a firm’s governance by Bebchuk et al.’s e-index (or entrenchment index) which potentially 
should have a strong negative correlation with the internal appointment. The lower 
entrenchment means better governance mechanism of the firms which means shareholders 
have more control over the management. The reason internal appointments are a result of 
better governance is that the firm knew the promoted CFO for a while. If the incumbent 
was not the optimal choice, then the board would not promote him/her as the CFO, but 
rather the firm would look for an external hire. Taylor (2010) states, “At each point in time, 
the board observes the two signals, assesses the CEO’s ability, and then decides optimally 
whether to replace him or her with a new CEO of uncertain ability (p. 2052).” The same 
assertion goes with the CFO, if firms find an eligible candidate inside the firm who the 
board knows and has a greater confidence in his or her abilities, then they will go for 
internal hire. An internal CFO who has a better understanding of the company and its 
stakeholders will improve the governance of the hiring firm. Because the firm has 
maintained a good rapport with the shareholders and newly appointed CFO is carrying out 
the board’s investment plan, there is no need to go for debt financing which inherently 
                                                          
21 The Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute, please refer to  http://irrcinstitute.org/ 
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increases a firm’s bankruptcy risk and often comes with stringent covenants or conditions.  
The following simple mathematical framework can be used to assess the effect of an 
internal CFO on governance and a firm’s choice of equity22: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿                                                   (1) 
Assuming an internal CFO improves governance, 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿                                                                        (2) 
Incorporating equation (2) into (1),  
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙)+𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿            
Or,             
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛾0) + (𝛽1𝛾1 + 𝛽2)𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿                                              (3) 
Proxy for a firm’s governance, e-index, and internal CFO (INTERNAL) cannot be 
present in the same equation, because an internal CFO improves governance (or 
governance is a function of an internal CFO) and putting them together on the right hand 
side would create a multicollinearity issue. In equation (3), 𝛽2 is the direct effect of an 
internal on a firm’s equity choice, and 𝛽1𝛾1 captures the indirect effect
23. In addition to 
OLS, I run the firm fixed effect in equation (3). The year fixed effect cannot be added 
because I only keep the firm-year in which a CFO turnover occurred and issue condition 
(>5% of assets) is met.  
                                                          
22 I intentionally keep out error terms to keep things simpler. 
23 An example using a similar type of specification can be found: 
https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/dranove/htm/dranove/coursepages/Mgmt%20469/choosing%
20variables.pdf 
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The prime responsibility of the CFO is to oversee firm’s financial reporting 
mechanism. The earlier argument of CFO impacting firm overall governance may seem 
overstated because typically governance mechanism can be impacted by the board and to 
some extent by the CEO. However, the CFO can impact governance by adopting fair and 
timely disclosure. I use the following regression incorporating Bid-Ask Spread as a conduit 
to improve firm governance by a CFO. Ideally, the CFO will have a negative impact of 
information asymmetry (represented by Bid-Ask Spread) and positive impact on firm 
equity issue. I use the following model incorporating information asymmetry: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚   (4) 
In the multiple regression framework, I use the following specification:  
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
+𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛. 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + Ln 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
           (5) 
Equity is defined as net equity issue24 scaled by beginning year book value of total 
assets by company i in fiscal year t. As in Chang et al. (2009), firm-years in which the net 
equity issue or net debt issue25 exceeds 5% of the beginning balance of the firm’s total 
assets are included in the sample; years in which both are 5% or neither is above the 5% 
cutoff are not included in the model. INTERNAL is an indicator variable, which takes a 
                                                          
24 Net equity issue = (Sale of Common and Preferred Stock- Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock)/TAt-
1 
25 Net debt issue = (Long Term Debt Issuance-Long Term Debt Reduction+ Current Debt Changes)/TAt-1 
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value of 1, if the appointed CFO is promoted and 0, if the appointed CFO is hired from the 
external labor market. The definition of the variables is provided in the appendix.  
Governance cannot be put in the regression because of the reasons stated above. 
The coefficient for INTERNAL captures both effects. In this type of specification, 
endogeneity can arise potentially from two sources26: a) omitted variable bias (in this case, 
one or more independent variables are correlated with error term, thus, violates the 
condition for OLS) and b) when an independent variable is a function of the dependent 
variable. In order to tackle endogeneity, I use instrumental regression and estimate the 
model by 2SLS (2-stage least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments) with 
robust standard errors, and GMM clustered by 2-digit SIC. I use the industry CFO ratio as 
the instrument. A similar instrument is used in Balsam et al. (2016). I have included all 
potential variables that can affect a firm’s choice of equity issue. These variables are chosen 
consulting extant literature. The model is controlled for clustering based on their 2-digit 
industry classification in order to take out biases from the model due to a clustering effect, 
if any. I also used Fama-French 48 industry classification27, and the results remained the 
same.  
The notion that the CFO improves firm governance by providing timely and 
accurate information can be captured by incorporating information asymmetry. If the 
                                                          
26 There is another source when variables are measured incorrectly, or from measurement error bias. As I 
use all the variables from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, IEBS, and other established data sources and follow the 
literature to define the variables used in the study, there is no or minimal measurement error. Usually 
measurement error arises from statistical estimation. I did not use any estimated variables in this specification.  
27 I follow Fama French 48 industry classification. The code for industry classification has been obtained 
from http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/deHaan/documents/industries_ff12.txt. The results are not reported in 
the paper, however, they are available upon request. 
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internally promoted CFO has a better knowledge of the firm’s reporting policies and knows 
the investor clientele, s/he should have an influence on information asymmetry (which will 
have an impact on governance28) and firm equity issue. Therefore, I can combine equation 
4 and equation 5 and assess the impact of INTERNAL on firm equity choice, while the 
CFO reduces information asymmetry: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚 +  𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛. 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + Ln 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
                   (6) 
Information asymmetry is represented by Bid-Ask Spread and is calculated for each 
stock as follows: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑-𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑=
∑ Closing Askd−Closing Bidd
T
i=1
T
                                             (7) 
Where, the daily closing bid price is subtracted from the daily closing ask price and 
divided by the number of trading days (=T) in a year. In the presence of information 
asymmetry, if INTERNAL significantly affects firm equity choice, then my earlier 
argument that CFOs reduce information asymmetry, improve governance, and issue equity 
holds. Moreover, equation (6) works as a robustness check for equation (5).  
2.4.2 Alternative Model 
I also do an alternative specification. I use a probit model using only the significant 
variables from the multiple regression framework (equation 5). I define the dependent 
                                                          
28 As I show earlier that I do not need to explicitly model the improvement of governance and equity issue 
together in the presence of the internal CFO. 
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variable either 1 or 0; it takes a value of 1, if a firm issues more than 5% equity in any year 
and 0, if it issues more than 5% debt in any year. The reason I do a probit model is to 
estimate the probability of issuing equity by an internally promoted CFO. I have the 
following specification: 
𝜋(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=2 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 )     (8) 
The 𝜋 on the left-hand side indicates the probability of equity issue by company i 
at fiscal year t.  The coefficient, 𝛼1 captures the probability of issuing equity.  The control 
variables are significant (5% or less) from the multiple regression framework (equation 5). 
2.5 Results 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics. It includes mean, standard deviation, and 
minimum and maximum values of the variables I use in the study. On average, the sample 
firms issue bigger sized debt than equity. The mean value for debt issue is 11.90% (of 
beginning book value of assets) with minimum and maximum of -24.60% and 82.30%, 
respectively. On the contrary, the mean value of equity issue is 2.80% with minimum and 
maximum of -41.00% and 76.30%. The negative minimum values indicate repurchase of 
shares and repayments of debt.  The average firm age is 14.89 years with the oldest firm 
having 62 years. About half of the firms have a rating history by Standard and Poor’s. The 
mean industry leverage ratio is 33.80%, which means that most of the firms have a 30:70 
leverage ratio (about 30% of the firm’s assets are financed by debt, while 70% of the assets 
are financed by equity). This ratio also tells us that firms have room to go for more equity 
if need be.  
Table 2.2 reports the correlations between the variables. I will mainly discuss the 
correlations between equity issue and other variables. Also, I will focus on the correlation 
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of internal CFOs with other variables. Firm equity choice and internal CFOs has a 
significant correlation of 0.14, however, internal CFOs and governance (e-index)  has a 
significant negative correlation (=-0.24), meaning that internal CFOs contribute to improve 
governance and increase a firm’s equity choice. However, from the correlation coefficient 
alone, causality cannot be established. I analyze the causal relation between internal CFOs 
and other key variables in the latter sections. Firm equity choice and internal CFOs have 
similar correlations with other variables. From mere observation of the correlation values 
of internal CFOs with other variables, I conjecture that the internal CFO is an important 
variable to explore.  
Table 2.3 includes the student’s t-test for two variables: debt issue and equity issue 
based on two categories of CFO appointments: CFOs promoted within the firms and CFOs 
hired from external labor market. Panel A reports the test for debt issue and panel B for 
equity issue. For debt issue, the two groups do not differ much (only 1.40%). Before 
running the actual t-test, I first run the equality of the variance test. The null hypothesis for 
the equality of the variance test is that the two groups have identical variance in terms of 
the debt issue. At the 10% level, I reject the null hypothesis and use the Satterthwaite 
method of t-test. The t-statistic is 1.30, therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
two groups have similar (mean) debt issue size. For equity issue, I follow the same test 
procedure: first, I conduct the equality of the variance test and then the student’s t-test. The 
F-value for “folded F” test is 1.28, therefore, I reject the null of equality of variance and 
use Satterthwaite method for t-test. I reject the null hypothesis that the equity issue size (% 
of assets) is similar for the two groups; the t-statistic is 4.68, which is significant at less 
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than 1% level. From this point, I will focus on the equity issue rather than the debt issue 
for the sample firms. 
In Table 2.4, I divide all the variables based on whether the firm promoted its CFO 
or hired CFO from an external labor market. I follow the same student’s t-test methodology 
as described earlier for all the variables tested. Column 1 includes the name of the variables; 
column 2-3 and column 4-5 report mean and standard deviation for the two groups. Column 
6 reports the mean difference (=mean value for the external CFOs-mean value for the 
internal CFOs) between the two groups. Column seven and eight report the t-statistic and 
statistical significance, respectively. “N/A” is used for no statistical significance between 
two groups. Among almost all of the variables, the groups differ from each other except in 
volatility of earnings, volatility of returns, and the industry leverage ratio. The mean value 
for governance under external CFO is more than 1 (i.e, 1.21), which means on average 
external CFO appointed firms have at least one of the six entrenchment provisions present. 
On the contrary, internally appointed CFO firms have an entrenchment value less than 1 
(i.e., 0.54), which means the majority of the internally appointed firms have better 
governance than their counterparts. These two groups of firms significantly differ in terms 
of governance; t-statistic is 7.91, which rejects the null hypothesis of same governance 
between two groups at 1% or less.  
The leverage ratio between two groups of firms significantly differs. On average, 
external CFO appointed firms have 38% leverage, whereas internally promoted CFOs have 
33% leverage ratio. The lower leverage ratio for an internal firm allows them more room 
to increase the debt in the future. Internal CFO appointing firms are younger than the 
external appointing firms; the average age of the internal CFO appointing firms is 12.72 
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years [=EXP(2.543)], whereas the mean age of the firms appointing external CFOs is 
approximately 17.43 year [=EXP(2.858)]. Due to being older, the older firms have more 
analysts following them, and more of them are rated by S&P as seen in the debt rating. 
Table 2.5 reports the triangular relation in the equity issue, governance, and internal 
CFOs. In equation (2), I have shown that internal CFOs significantly improve governance 
by reducing the entrenchment of a firm. The third column in the table shows that internal 
CFOs reduce entrenchment by 0.67 units, which is statistically significant at 1% level. 
Governance could possibly affect equity issue of firms. The problem is if I put both internal 
and proxy for governance (entrenchment index) as RHS variables to define a firm’s equity 
choice when governance is a function of internal CFOs, then the coefficient will be biased. 
Therefore, the simple way around this is to use only internal CFOs, which capture both its 
own effect (direct) and governance effect (indirect), and the coefficient would be unbiased. 
In column two, when I put them together, both of them are statistically significant with 
right signs: 1-unit increase of governance (or decrease of entrenchment by one provision) 
would increase a firm’s equity size by 1.90%. On the other hand, promoting an internal 
CFO will increase a firm’s equity size by 3.30%, which is a biased estimate. In column 
four, I put only internal (refer to Equation #3) to capture both internal and governance 
effect on a firm’s equity choice, I find internal CFOs increase a firm’s equity by 4.60% 
which is an unbiased estimate.29 The fifth column includes the firm-fixed effect (fe) model. 
The results are similar to that from OLS. The coefficient for internal CFO is a little bit 
higher than the OLS, 4.70%.  
                                                          
29 The properties of a true estimator are: best, linear, and unbiased estimator (BLUE).   
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In the last column, I report the output from equation (4). In the presence of 
information asymmetry, internal CFOs still positively (and significantly) affect the firm 
equity issue. The coefficient of INTERNAL is 0.068 with a t-value of 4.78. In the next 
section, I will shed light on the relation of the equity issue and internal CFOs in a multiple 
regression framework. 
Table 2.6 reports outputs from four estimation processes: OLS, 2SLS-IV, GMM-
Robust and GMM-Cluster. In the second column, OLS output is reported. My variable of 
interest—internal CF—has a significant positive effect on a firm’s equity choice. OLS here 
may not be BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator) due to endogeneity. In this specification, 
endogeneity can generate from two sources: a) internal CFO affects equity and at the same 
time, a firm which wants to issue equity appoints/promotes internals as CFOs, and b) 
omitted variables. In order to handle the endogeneity issue, I use instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions. Following Balsam et al. (2016), I use the industry CFO ratio as an instrument. 
Finding a good instrument is always a challenge. A good instrument should not be 
correlated with the dependent variable, a firm’s equity issue, however, it should be 
positively correlated with internal CFOs. I defined the proportion of firms (excluding the 
sample firms) in the industry (2-digit SIC) that employ internal or external candidates as 
CFOs. I test the validity or strength of the defined instrument. The partial F-statistic 45.66 
and the R2 in the first stage (regressing internal on industry CFO ratio) is 17.60%, which 
indicates the instrument has sufficient power in explaining a firm’s internal CFOs choice. 
I use three estimation techniques: 2SLS (two stage least squares), GMM (generalized 
method of moments) with robust standard errors, and GMM with clustering.  
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Under 2SLS-IV, GMM-Robust and GMM-Cluster, internal CFOs are positive and 
significant on a firm’s equity issue. The difference between 2SLS-IV and GMM robust is 
that GMM robust penalizes by assigning higher standard errors. The standard error for 
INTERNAL under 2SLS is 0.037 and under GMM robust it is 0.040. The other significant 
variables that affect a firm’s equity size are leverage, ROA, finance size, number of 
analysts, return volatility, and compounded stock returns. Leverage, ROA, and number of 
analysts affect a firm’s equity negatively. Higher levered firms will not go for equity 
because it is riskier for the new investors to buy stocks of a firm, which is already highly 
leveraged. If the firm has a higher return, it does not need external financing; it can use its 
internal finance or retained earnings. A similar finding is reported by Chang et al. (2009)30. 
The coefficient for the number of analysts is a little unexpected. Usually, more analysts 
should enhance a firm’s credibility among investors to sell equity. However, in this 
scenario, it may be the case that as more and more analysts start following a firm, the better 
the credit rating goes, which eventually entices the firm to go for the debt financing. This 
is a plausible explanation as we have seen that lowly leveraged firms appoint internals as 
CFOs (refer to Table 2.4).  
Finance size is the amount of money needed from external sources. This should be 
positively related with equity financing because equity is a major component of external 
financing. In the equity issue process, firms take advantage of timing. For example, 
Greenwood (2005) shows that firms issue equity when they think their stocks are 
overvalued in the market. Both the return volatility and compounded returns are positively 
                                                          
30 See Table 5, p.1105. 
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affecting equity issue of the firm, and so justifies the market timing. At good times, firms 
may issue equity and at bad times, firms may buy back (or repurchase) some existing 
equity. Therefore, return volatility is positively related with firms’ equity choice.  
Table 2.7 reports the influence of internal CFOs on firm equity choice in the 
presence of information asymmetry (refer to equation 6). The CFO being the second 
responsible person for financial reporting can significantly improve governance by 
reducing information asymmetry (IA). In all four models, INTERNAL is significant (at 1% 
or less) and positive, which means internal CFOs can reduce information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry improves firm governance, which in turn incentivizes the firms to 
go for equity financing. The interaction term, INTERNAL*IA, is significant and negative, 
which ensures my earlier proposition that internal CFOs can improve firm governance by 
reducing information asymmetry. The other significant variables are: leverage ratio, ROA, 
finance size, number of analysts, volatility of returns, and compounded returns. 
Table 2.8 provides the results from alternative specification and the probit model, 
using the significant variables (at least 5% level of significance) from multiple regressions. 
The significant variables are: internal CFO, leverage ratio, ROA, financing size, share 
turnover, number of analysts, volatility of stock returns, and compounded returns.  Unlike 
previous models, the probit model gives an estimated probability of happening of a 
dependent variable, which take a value of either 1 or 0) by a specific independent variable. 
Table 2.8, Panel A provides a probabilistic outcome, whereas Panel B provides an effect 
outcome at the mean. In both scenarios, internal CFO is significant and positive. Output 
from the probit model says that there is a 20% higher probability for an internal CFO to 
issue equity than an external CFO. Output from a marginal effect at the mean is saying an 
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internal CFO would issue equity about 5.40% of total assets within a year s/he takes office.  
This finding is consistent with the findings from the multiple frameworks discussed in the 
earlier section. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this essay, I show that firms with internal CFO appointments take the advantage 
of going into the stock market within one year of such appointments. This finding is robust 
under various specifications. The internal CFOs act as a conduit to improve a firm’s 
governance mechanism by significantly reducing information asymmetry, and firms try to 
take advantage of CFO appointments by issuing equity. I use the entrenchment index 
created by Bebchuk et al. (2008), which has been widely used as a parameter for firm 
governance. I find that an internal CFO simultaneously reduces information asymmetry 
and solicits funds by selling equity. Firms that promote an internal as the CFO are also 
younger, lowly leveraged, and have better growth prospects than the firms that hire the 
CFO from external labor markets.  
What do firms do with the funds collected from the stock market? I cannot answer 
that question explicitly without further analysis. Firms submit S-filings before equity issue 
and will have to mention the specific reason(s) for the equity issue. The reasons mentioned 
in the S-filings are to invest, to retire some existing debt, or for general corporate purpose. 
The last reason is a little bit ambiguous. Walker and Yost (2008) show that the stock market 
reacts favorably in the scenario where firms use the proceeds from stock repurchase for 
further investment and provide investors with specific plans of such investment. Without 
knowing the motive of the equity issue, I cannot say why the stock market reacted favorably 
for the equity issue by an internal CFO. I leave this interesting issue for future endeavors.  
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Figure 2.1 Why I have defined internal CFO as having year-difference is >=2 years 
Firm A (1-year difference): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm B (2-year difference): 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. On average, 
the sample companies issue more debt than equity (11.80% versus 3.10%). The sample 
has almost half and half distribution of EXTERNAL and INTERNAL CFOs. All the 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level (except indicator or dummy variables). 
Variable NOBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Debt percent 1,045 0.119 0.177 -0.246 0.823 
Equity percent 1,045 0.028 0.160 -0.410 0.763 
INTERNAL 1,045 0.495 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Ln of assets 1,045 6.996 1.532 3.543 11.127 
Tangibility 1,043 0.306 0.236 0.013 0.902 
Leverage ratio 1,043 0.359 0.210 0.017 0.905 
ROA 1,045 0.016 0.153 -0.907 0.276 
Market-to-book ratio 1,044 2.129 1.481 0.788 8.961 
Financing size 1,045 0.098 0.107 -0.195 0.408 
Share turnover 966 1.986 1.559 0.192 8.142 
Ln of firm age 1,040 2.701 0.830 0.000 4.127 
Debt rating 1,045 0.464 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Number of analyst 1,045 10.283 9.740 0.000 41.000 
Earnings volatility 734 0.068 0.074 0.010 0.466 
Return volatility 966 0.030 0.015 0.010 0.085 
Compounded return 964 0.238 0.888 -0.846 5.545 
Industry leverage ratio 1,045 0.338 0.143 0.074 0.715 
Industry Internal CFO ratio 1,045 0.025 0.024 0.000 0.121 
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Table 2.2 Correlations 
This table reports the correlations between the variables. The correlations between internal CFOs and equity size and between 
internal CFOs and governance is significantly positive and negative, respectively. That means internal CFO appointment is 
positively associated with equity issue and negatively associated with governance. The values in bold are significant at 5% or 
lower.   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Equity 1.00                  
INTERAL 0.14 1.00                 
Governance -0.19 -0.24 1.00                
B-A Spread 0.09 0.42 -0.25 1.00               
Ln of assets -0.37 -0.18 0.23 -0.19 1.00              
Tangibility -0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.06 1.00             
Lev. ratio -0.27 -0.12 0.08 -0.08 0.33 0.18 1.00            
ROA -0.20 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.22 -0.01 -0.26 1.00           
M-to-B ratio 0.27 0.11 -0.12 0.09 -0.26 -0.20 -0.65 0.10 1.00          
Fin. size 0.47 0.06 -0.07 0.10 -0.25 -0.03 0.04 -0.29 -0.03 1.00         
Share turn. 0.13 -0.15 0.09 -0.33 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.17 0.05 1.00        
Ln_firm_age -0.27 -0.19 0.27 -0.15 0.46 0.02 0.26 0.06 -0.27 -0.19 -0.15 1.00       
Debt rating -0.24 -0.10 0.17 -0.06 0.65 0.13 0.37 0.04 -0.24 -0.15 -0.03 0.39 1.00      
Num_analyst -0.15 -0.09 0.27 -0.17 0.42 0.08 -0.12 0.13 0.06 -0.15 0.23 0.13 0.25 1.00     
Ern. vola. 0.29 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.42 -0.08 -0.19 -0.39 0.33 0.18 0.24 -0.33 -0.28 -0.06 1.00    
Ret. vola. 0.36 0.04 -0.14 -0.02 -0.42 -0.04 -0.02 -0.42 0.21 0.19 0.40 -0.32 -0.27 -0.16 0.34 1.00   
Comp. rets. 0.26 0.10 -0.13 0.04 -0.14 -0.08 -0.32 0.16 0.39 0.08 0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 0.07 0.12 1.00  
Ind. lev. rat. -0.19 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.24 0.28 0.59 0.00 -0.42 -0.08 -0.11 0.17 0.24 -0.03 -0.24 -0.06 -0.15 1.00 
1=Equity percent, 2= Internal CFO, 3=Governance, 4=Bid-Ask Spread, 5= Ln of assets, 6= Tangibility, 7= Leverage ratio, 8= 
ROA, 9= Market-to-Book ratio, 10= Finance size, 11= Share turnover, 12= Ln of firm age, 13= Debt rating, 14= Number of 
analysts, 15= Earnings volatility, 16= Return volatility, 17= Compounded return, 18=Industry leverage ratio.
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Table 2.3 Debt-equity Choice by Internal and External CFOs 
This table reports a firm’s debt-equity choice of internal versus external CFOs. Internal 
CFO=1 and external CFO=0. First, I run the equality of variance test between these two 
groups of CFOs. I fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of variance test at the 10% 
level of significance and therefore, I use Satterthwaite method for the t-test. Debt issue is 
not significantly different between the two groups of CFOs. On the contrary, equity issue 
is significant at 1% level (t-value is 4.07). On average, internal CFOs issue 4.30% more 
equity in the year of appointment than external CFOs.  
Panel A: Debt issue (%) 
INTERNAL N Mean St. Dev St. Err Minimum Maximum 
0 528 0.126 0.171 0.007 -0.246 0.823 
1 517 0.112 0.184 0.008 -0.246 0.823 
Diff (1-2)  0.014 0.177 0.011   
Method Variances DF t Value Pr > |t|   
Pooled Equal 1043.000 1.300 0.194   
Satterthwaite Unequal 1034.100 1.300 0.194   
Equality of Variances   
Method Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F   
Folded F 516.000 527.000 1.160 0.100   
Panel B: Equity issue (%) 
INTERNAL N Mean St. Dev St. Err Minimum Maximum 
0 528 0.006 0.148 0.006 -0.410 0.763 
1 517 0.051 0.168 0.007 -0.410 0.763 
Diff (1-2)  -0.046 0.158 0.010   
Method Variances DF t Value Pr > |t|   
Pooled Equal 1043 -4.69 <.0001   
Satterthwaite Unequal 1022 -4.68 <.0001   
Equality of Variances   
Method Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F   
Folded F 516 527 1.28 0.005   
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Table 2.4 T-test on Other Variables between Two Groups 
This table reports all of the important variables that I use in the study and the difference 
between the two groups of CFOs. Sixth column is the mean difference (=external CFO-
internal CFO) between the two groups of CFOs. Column 7 is a t-statistic from t-tests, where 
the null hypothesis is the mean difference of zero between the two groups. I first used the 
folded F-test to test for the equality of variance and then run the t-test. If I fail to reject the 
null hypothesis in the Folded F-test, then I use the “Pooled method” of t-test. However, if 
I reject the null in the folded F-test, then I used the “Satterthwaite method.” The last column 
delineates the significance level. 
 External CFO 
(1) 
Internal CFO 
(2) 
   
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Diff (1-
2) 
t-
value 
Signifi
cance 
E-Index 1.208 1.560 0.542 1.136 0.667 7.91 *** 
Ln of assets 7.268 1.581 6.719 1.428 0.550 5.90 *** 
Tangibility 0.291 0.231 0.321 0.240 -0.030 -2.05 ** 
Leverage ratio 0.384 0.208 0.334 0.210 0.050 3.86 *** 
ROA -0.001 0.173 0.034 0.127 -0.035 -3.70 *** 
Market-to-Book ratio 1.965 1.241 2.296 1.676 -0.331 -3.62 *** 
Financing size 0.092 0.109 0.105 0.106 -0.012 -1.85 * 
Share turnover 2.214 1.548 1.748 1.537 0.466 4.69 *** 
Ln of firm age 2.858 0.758 2.543 0.869 0.314 6.21 *** 
Debt rating 0.511 0.500 0.416 0.493 0.096 3.11 *** 
Number of analyst 11.197 10.096 9.350 9.281 1.847 3.08 *** 
Volatility of earnings 0.071 0.084 0.064 0.058 0.007 1.31 N/A 
Volatility of return 0.030 0.016 0.031 0.014 -0.001 -1.32 N/A 
Compounded return 0.148 0.798 0.332 0.964 -0.183 -3.21 *** 
Industry leverage 
ratio 
0.339 0.138 0.336 0.147 0.003 0.31 N/A 
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Table 2.5   Effect of Internal CFO on Governance and Equity Issue 
The following table includes the effect of internal CFO appointments on the firm’s 
governance and equity issue based on the specification discussed in equations 1-3. When I 
put both internal and governance (e-index) as dependent variables to determine the effect 
on firm’s equity issue, I essentially get a biased coefficient for internal. Because the 
internal CFO improves firm governance (or equivalently governance is a function of 
INTERNAL), I cannot use both of them as RHS variables. When I use INTERNAL as the 
only RHS variable, the coefficient includes both the direct and the indirect (due to 
governance) effect on firm’s equity choice. The fifth column reports the firm-fixed model.  
The last column shows influence of INTERNAL on firm equity issue in the presence of 
information asymmetry (IA). IA is represented by bid-ask spread. The t-statistic is in the 
parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level of significance. 
 Equation 
#1 
Dep. Var.: 
Equity 
size 
Equation 
#2 
Dep. Var.: 
Governan
ce 
Equation 
#3 
Dep. Var.: 
Equity 
size 
Equation 
#3, fe 
Dep. Var.: 
Equity 
size 
Equation 
#4 
Dep. Var.: 
Equity 
size 
Governance -0.019***                    
 (-5.30)                    
INTERNAL 0.033*** -0.667*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.068*** 
 (3.36) (-7.88) (4.69) (4.90) (4.78) 
Infor. Asymm. (IA)     0.098**  
     (2.30) 
INTERNAL*IA     -0.117**  
     (-2.27)    
Constant 0.028*** 1.208*** 0.006 0.005 -0.006 
 (3.52) (20.31) (0.81) (0.73) (-0.73)    
R-squared 0.046 0.056 0.021 0.021 0.032 
N. of OBS 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 966 
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Table 2.6 Internal CFO and Firm Equity Choice 
This table reports the relation between internal CFOs and firm equity issue in multiple 
regression framework. Four models are reported here. In the second column, simple OLS 
output is reported. In the third to fifth column, instrumental regression under 2SLS, GMM 
with robust standard errors (assigned a positive definite weight matrix) and clustered (by 
2-digit industry) GMM estimation processes are reported. In all four specifications, internal 
CFO is significant. Under the instrumental regression estimations, the coefficient is 
unbiased.  Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.  ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 
10% statistical level of significance. 
Dependent variable: 
equity (%) 
OLS 2SLS-IV 
GMM 
Robust 
GMM SIC 
Cluster 
INTERNAL 0.022** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.009) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) 
Ln of assets -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
Tangibility 0.020 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.019) -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 
Leverage ratio -0.121*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.129*** 
 -0.031 -0.034 -0.033 -0.031 
ROA -0.088** -0.155*** -0.155** -0.155*** 
 -0.037 -0.048 -0.066 -0.051 
Market-to-market ratio 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
Finance size 0.504*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 
 -0.045 -0.049 -0.080 -0.056 
Share turnover 0.006 0.014*** 0.014** 0.014*** 
 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
Ln of firm age 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
Debt rating 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
Number of analysts -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Earnings volatility 0.080 0.089 0.089 0.089* 
 -0.073 -0.078 -0.099 -0.053 
Return volatility 1.509*** 1.244*** 1.244*** 1.244*** 
 -0.397 -0.437 -0.413 -0.377 
Compounded return 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
Constant -0.028 -0.112** -0.112** -0.112** 
 -0.043 -0.056 -0.054 -0.056 
R-squared 0.369 0.263 0.263 0.263 
NOBS 672 672 672 672 
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Table 2.7 Internal CFO and Information Asymmetry 
This table reports the relation between internal CFOs with firm information asymmetry 
and firm equity issue in multiple regression framework. Four models are reported here. In 
the second column, simple OLS output is reported. In the third to fifth column, instrumental 
regression under 2SLS, GMM with robust standard errors (assigned a positive definite 
weight matrix) and clustered (by 2-digit industry codes) GMM estimation processes are 
reported. In all four specifications, internal CFO is significant. Under the instrumental 
regression estimations, the coefficient is unbiased.  Standard errors are reported in the 
parenthesis.  ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level of significance.  
 OLS 2SLS IV GMM 
Robust 
GMM SIC 
Cluster   
INTERNAL 0.033*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
  (0.012) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) 
Information asymmetry (IA) 0.032 0.110** 0.110** 0.110*** 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.051) (0.041) 
INTERNAL*IA -0.058 -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** 
  (0.044) (0.082) (0.084) (0.072) 
Ln of assets -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Tangibility 0.02 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Leverage ratio -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
ROA -0.089** -0.121*** -0.121** -0.121*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.056) (0.047) 
Market-to-market ratio 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Finance size 0.501*** 0.477*** 0.477*** 0.477*** 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.076) (0.055) 
Share turnover 0.006 0.009** 0.009** 0.009**  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln of firm age 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Debt rating 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Number of analysts -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Earnings volatility 0.085 0.100 0.100 0.100**  
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.093) (0.048) 
Return volatility 1.463*** 1.228*** 1.228*** 1.228*** 
 (0.400) (0.419) (0.390) (0.340) 
Compounded return 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant -0.029 -0.069 -0.069 -0.069 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) 
R-squared 0.370 0.331 0.331 0.331 
NOBS 672 672 672 672 
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Table 2.8 Internal CFO and Firm Equity Choice (Probit Model) 
This table reports the results from the probit model (equation 5) using variables that are 
significant (5% or less) under OLS and IV estimations (refer to Table 2.6). Unlike multiple 
regression, probit provides a probabilistic measure of a variable on the dependent variable 
instead of the extent of effects or coefficients. All eight variables are significant (refer to 
P>z column) including the variable of interest, INTERNAL. Panel A provides probabilistic 
outcome, whereas Panel B provides effect outcome at the mean. In both scenarios, internal 
CFO is significant and positive. Output from probit model says that there is a 21% greater 
probability for an internal CFO to issue equity than an external CFO. Output from marginal 
effect is saying an internal CFO would issue equity about 6% of total assets after s/he takes 
office.      
 Coef. Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval]  
Panel A: Probit Output:     
INTERNAL 0.200 0.107 1.870 0.061 -0.009 0.410  
Leverage ratio -2.878 0.293 -9.810 0.000 -3.453 -2.303  
ROA -1.370 0.394 -3.480 0.001 -2.141 -0.598  
Financing Size -1.900 0.522 -3.640 0.000 -2.923 -0.877  
Share turnover 0.069 0.038 1.820 0.069 -0.005 0.143  
Number of analysts -0.018 0.006 -2.960 0.003 -0.029 -0.006  
Return Volatility 27.492 4.311 6.380 0.000 19.042 35.942  
Compounded returns 0.150 0.061 2.450 0.014 0.030 0.270  
Constant  -0.568 0.199 -2.860 0.004 -0.957 -0.178  
Number of OBS = 962 
LR chi2(8) =291.85        
Prob > chi2 = 0.000        
Log likelihood =-387.7839      
Pseudo R2 = 0.2734        
 
Panel B: Marginal Effect at the Mean (dy/dx) 
variable dy/dx Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [    
95% 
C.I.   ] X 
INTERNAL* 0.054 0.029 1.870 0.062 -0.003 0.112 0.492 
Leverage ratio -0.782 0.078 -9.990 0.000 -0.935 -0.628 0.349 
ROA -0.372 0.108 -3.450 0.001 -0.583 -0.161 0.020 
Financing Size -0.516 0.141 -3.660 0.000 -0.792 -0.240 0.099 
Share turnover 0.019 0.010 1.810 0.070 -0.002 0.039 1.985 
Number of analysts -0.005 0.002 -2.980 0.003 -0.008 -0.002 11.147 
Return Volatility 7.467 1.180 6.330 0.000 5.155 9.780 0.030 
Compounded returns 0.041 0.017 2.420 0.016 0.008 0.074 0.239 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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CHAPTER 3: DOES THE CFO APPOINTMENT AFFECT THE FIRM’S 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT?  
3.1 Introduction  
The objective of this essay is to investigate the effect of Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) appointments31 on the firm’s information environment. The CFO assumes an 
important responsibility for overseeing the firm’s financial system, including financial 
planning, budgeting, internal control, capital raising, tax management, and financial 
strategy (Mian, 2001). The CFO monitors a firm’s financial reporting process, and 
therefore, holds key fiduciary responsibility for creating and disseminating accurate 
information about the firm’s financial condition (Geiger and North, 2006). In this study, I 
answer the question of whether the CFO is considered as second-in-command and thus, if 
his/her replacement instigates market reaction. Or, are CFOs considered as a member of 
the executive team and his/her turnover is inconsequential? The reason I anticipate a market 
reaction following a CFO turnover is the personal legal obligation given to the CFO in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 200232. I limit my study to a firm’s information environment 
due to the fact that the primary responsibility of the CFO toward the firm is both statutory 
and discretionary financial disclosure33. I use a longer period (+/- 365 days) to capture price 
                                                          
31 I use “turnover,” “replacement,” “change,” and “appointment” interchangeably. 
32 From section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, “The Commission shall, by rule, require, for each 
company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78m, 78o (d)), that the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or 
officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or 
submitted…” For the complete text please refer to: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf. 
33 Warner et al. (1988) find that top management change (a change in the title of CEO, president or chairman 
of the board) is not a significant effect, however, Bonnier and Bruner (1989) argue that Warner et al. do not 
find any significant abnormal return surrounding top management change because they mix the distressed 
and sound firms together. Thus, for some firms top management change has (negative) information effect 
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informativeness that is reflected in the firm’s stock price due to a firm event such as CFO 
change. In addition, unlike previous research, my conclusion does not depend on a specific 
group sample. For example, Bonnier and Bruner (1989) and Mian (2001) use only CFOs 
removed by disciplinary actions and replacement of top management teams (does not 
include CFOs) of financially distressed firms respectively to test market reaction by 
abnormal returns. I posit that considering an analytical approach beyond the event study 
and utilizing a longer time horizon, I can capture the stock price informativeness due to an 
important event of a firm such as the replacement of CFOs.  The perception of investors 
depends on the information environment in which the firm operates. In the short-run, 
markets can (over)react to any news and right afterwards can adjust for the overreaction. 
Therefore, two things are important: first, we must look beyond a short-term reaction 
(which can be a mere stimulus or noise), and second, we must employ tools, such as 
idiosyncratic variance and synchronous trading, to evaluate a holistic information 
environment. Even though a firm changes its CFO for the betterment of its stockholders, 
due to operating in an opaque information environment, the market may not perceive such 
“goodness” and consider it as a routine event.  
Jiang et al. (2010) show that because CFOs have a greater role in financial reporting 
than CEOs, CFOs would be more prone to earnings management. They find that the 
magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analysts’ forecasts are more sensitive 
to CFO equity incentive than that of CEOs. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that 
“manager-specific effects matter both economically and statistically for the policy 
                                                          
and for some firms, the top management change has (positive) real effect. The final outcome is insignificant 
abnormal return. Bonnier and Bruner only consider the distressed firms for which market was expecting top 
management change and such change produces significant abnormal returns. 
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decisions of firms (p. 1181).” Therefore, CFO turnover should be an important event for a 
firm and its stakeholders. Moreover, CFO replacement for a bad performing or distressed 
firm is even more important because the objective of such replacement is to ensure 
investors about the corrective actions by the management. Li et al. (2010) show that in the 
aftermath of adverse SOX 404 opinions by auditors, if the firm replaces its old CFO with 
a better qualified one, it receives clean opinions the following year. I analyze both 
situations: all firms together and only distressed firms.     
Cools and Van-Praag (2007) show that the stock market values the scenario 
favorably when management of a firm replaces its top executive(s) with concurrent 
announcements of new hire(s) from outside. Mian (2001) shows that for poorly performing 
firms, replacement of the CFO from outside placates the upset investors. In addition, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) comment, “…one might argue that outside managers have 
‘stronger’ or ‘better’ styles on average, as firms are willing to look outside their 
organization to find these managers (p. 1180).” Thus, identifying the turnover of CFOs and 
concurrent replacement from inside or outside should be reflected in the stock prices. 
Again, how well a firm’s action has been perceived by the stock market investors depends 
on the information environment in which the firm operates.  
The information environment of a firm is affected or determined by a few factors 
such as ownership structure (for example, if a firm has more block holders the information 
quality is better, Brockman and Yan, 2009), costs of obtaining information (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980), and the number of analysts following the firm (Chan and Hameed, 2006). 
I use the variables that define the informativeness for each firm and analyze how the 
replacement of a CFO affects the informativeness reflected in the stock price. I avoid using 
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event study methodology, which has traditionally been used to evaluate market reaction, 
due to events such as the replacement of top management teams, revolving door hiring 
policies, removal of the CFOs etc. Instead, I use the number of analysts following, analysts’ 
forecast error, and analysts’ forecast dispersion as measures to analyze firm information 
environment quality. The dispersion of analyst forecasts has been used in the literature to 
test analysts’ information environment, uncertainty, and a firm’s information risk (see 
Barron et al., 1998; Barron and Stuerke, 1998; Thomas, 2002; Johnson, 2004). Similar to 
Brockman and Yan (2009), I also use two other proxies for information environment 
quality. They are idiosyncratic volatility and stock return synchronicity (Morck et al., 
2000). Thus, I used five information environment proxies: firm’s idiosyncratic variances, 
synchronicity, number of analysts following, analysts’ forecast error, and analysts’ forecast 
dispersion. Furthermore, I divide the firms based on whether they hire fresh from outside 
(defined as external CFOs) or promote an internal candidate as a CFO (defined as internal 
CFO).   
At the univariate level, I find that synchronicity in stock trading increases (which 
indicates a higher information quality) significantly by a new CFO. The mean difference 
between the pre and the post appointments is 0.17 (t-value=3.26). Overall, internal CFOs 
improve the information environment more than external CFOs. Firms earning negative 
ROAs for the last three years or more can significantly improve information environment 
by hiring a new CFO. For example, firms earning negative returns for the last five years 
can improve in at least three proxies of information environment: idiosyncratic variances, 
number of analysts, and forecast dispersion. 
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At the multivariate level, overall, there is no significant improvement in the 
information environment with a new CFO. However, firms earning negative ROAs for the 
last three or more years can improve information environment in some proxies: 
synchronicity, idiosyncratic variances, number of analysts, and forecast dispersion. This 
improvement in information environment is achieved from hiring an external CFO that is 
consistent with the finding in Mian (2001). 
I contribute to the existing literature in a few aspects. First, after the SOX, the 
importance of the chief financial officer of a firm has grown significantly. One would 
expect stock market participants to evaluate the change of the CFO as an important event 
and adjust their expected payoffs accordingly. However, the reaction to such change 
depends on the firm’s information environment. For example, a Fortune 500 company is 
followed by a large number of analysts34. When the CFO of such a company changes, a 
large group of investors are notified via a greater network of analysts. Whereas, analysts 
do not have incentives to follow smaller companies. Number of analysts is considered as a 
proxy for information environment quality (Chan and Hameed, 2006). I analyze the effects 
of CFO replacement on firm’s information environment, which covers a broad spectrum 
of firm information quality, rather than identifying a short-term market over reaction that 
can evaporate fairly quickly.  
Second, while other papers analyze CFO change in terms of short-term price 
reaction, I follow the long-term cross sectional difference-in-difference (DND) 
                                                          
34 Bhushan (1989) argues that the payoff from the analyst’s services from following a company is related to 
its size. For this reason, large companies are able to attract more analysts than small firms. Alford and Berger 
(1999) argue that analysts have incentives to follow firms with higher trading volumes. 
69 
 
methodology to estimate the impact of CFO change on a firm’s information environment. 
After Mian (2001), who has done a comprehensive analysis on firms’ cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) surrounding CFO changes, there is a vacuum in the literature. My work 
fills this gap in the literature. Research on CFOs is important because the CFO plays an 
important role in creating a sound information environment for the firms. CFOs have 
discretion on how much information should be shared with outside sources in addition to 
statutory disclosure requirements. Finally, I use the established (taken from extant 
literature) tools of information environment to bypass any issue of omitted variable bias in 
the determination of a firm’s information environment. I use five proxies35 to test the effect 
of CFO replacements on a firm’s overall information environment. Three of the five 
proxies are related to the analysts who are a prime source of information with articulated 
profit reports and serve as an information gateway to the investors of a firm. 
3.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Information Environment and CFO Change 
Information environment of a firm means: the all-inclusive process of generating, 
processing, disseminating, and using both accounting and non-accounting information. 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) define it as “…the extent to which stock prices incorporate 
firm-specific information in an accurately and timely manner (p. 216).” The higher the 
information precision the better the firm-specific informational environment. The firm-
specific information quality can be improved by generating precise, accurate, and timely 
                                                          
35 The reason I use five proxies is the CFO change is abstract. It is expected that over the long term the CFO 
change brings more profits and generates more cash for the firm. However, market is not always efficient 
and the effects from the CFO change may be missed by some measures but may be captured by some other 
measures.  
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information at the firm level. In addition, choosing the correct channel of information and 
complying to a higher standard improves information precision. For example, Foucalt and 
Gehrig (2008), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), and Herrmann et al. (2015) show that 
following cross listing, non-US firms enjoy better information environment due to stricter 
disclosure requirements and a higher number of analysts following them. Earlier research 
finds that via cross-listing non-US firms enjoy higher positive abnormal return, lower cost 
of capital, and higher Tobin’s q ratio (see Miller, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Doidge 
et al., 2004). These findings are in support of the bonding hypothesis which states that 
cross-listing enables non-US firms with a listing on a US stock exchange to move from a 
poor environment to an improved environment. This environment is enhanced by the 
higher disclosure requirement, greater enforcement, and moderated litigation procedures 
(Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008; Coffee, 2002).  
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has a key fiduciary responsibility of preparing 
the firm’s financial statements and representing the true financial condition of the firm 
(Indjejikian and Matejka, 2009). The CFO has the expertise and independence to determine 
what number gets reported and whether earnings targets have been met or not (Mian, 2001; 
Geiger and North, 2006). Graham et al. (2005), from a survey of 400 CFOs, report that 
more than 90% of the CFOs opt for voluntary disclosure to earn a reputation for 
transparency or accuracy. More than 80% want to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the informed and uniformed investors.36  Statutory requirements for disclosure do 
not incorporate management’s private information. Therefore, CFOs reduce the costs of 
                                                          
36 Uninformed investors ask for a premium when they trade with informed investors (such as management 
or insider investors). Thus, the more skeptical they are about the stock price of a firm the more (information 
risk) premium they ask for. 
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collecting firm-level information and attract more analysts to follow the firm with higher 
voluntary disclosure (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Graham et al., 2005). 
Both a higher number of analysts following a firm and minimal costs of acquiring 
information contribute to the improvement of information precision. Moreover, Lobo and 
Zhou (2006) show an increase in conservatism in financial reporting subsequent to SOX. 
They find that firms report less accounting accruals and adjust losses quicker than the pre-
SOX era. Li et al. (2010) find that when firms receive an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion, 
there is a spike in CFO turnover the following year and a more qualified CFO is hired to 
receive a clean opinion. Therefore, CFOs play an important role in a firm’s financial 
reporting quality and consequently, impact the information environment of the firms.  
The motivation of this research lies in the fact that CFOs independently play a role 
to ensure price informativeness of the firm’s stocks by various means, such as voluntary 
disclosure, in addition to the statutory disclosure requirement, press release, newsletters, 
meeting with investors, and conference calls. Graham et al. (2005) report that CFOs do not 
establish a precedence of voluntary disclosure which they cannot maintain permanently. 
They comment, “Many interviewed CFOs state that reducing uncertainty about the firm’s 
prospects is the most important motivation for making voluntary disclosure (p. 54).”  The 
informational risk can be reduced by making the future earnings of the firm more predictive 
via discretionary disclosure (as markets hate negative surprises) (Graham et al., 2005). 
Moreover, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that 
voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors and thus, increases the liquidity of the firm’s stock.  
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3.2.2 Information Environment Proxies 
Table 3.1 lists the proxies for information environment used in this essay. It is 
difficult to directly measure the information environment of a firm37. However, the listed 
proxies have been used by extant literature to gauge the firm’s information environment.   
3.2.3 Testable Hypotheses 
Change of the chief financial officer (CFO) can be a significant event if investors 
were expecting such a change. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) show that investors’ interest is 
well served by top management dismissal when they are already aware of the negative 
performance of the management. Therefore, I posit that: 
Hypothesis 1: The replacement of the chief financial officer (CFO) affects firm-
specific information environment. 
The CFO successor announcement can either be concurrent, i.e., at the time of the 
dismissal announcement of the old CFO, or be subsequent. For the chief executive officer 
(CEO) the concurrent announcement of the successor is common (Cools and Van Praag, 
2007). Furtado and Rozeff (1987) show that when top management dismissal 
announcement is contaminated with simultaneous successor announcement, the wealth 
effect is overestimated. Therefore, it is necessary to isolate the “pure” dismissal 
announcement from the dismissal with concurrent successor announcements.   
The market response is mixed with regards to the CFO being appointed from either 
external or internal sources. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) argue that hiring the top executives 
from an external source signals unsuccessful human capital investment and it disappoints 
                                                          
37 As pointed out by Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), “It is hard to test this relation (the relation between a 
firm’s information environment and cross-listing) because we cannot directly measure a firm’s information 
environment.” 
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the investors. In contrast, Mian (2001) shows that when CFOs are removed via disciplinary 
actions and replaced by internal hires, the market reacts in a significantly negative manner. 
Geiger and North (2006) find that when the CFO is replaced from outside, discretionary 
accruals reduce significantly, i.e. the newly appointed CFO shifts the blame to the outgoing 
CFO or makes a “clean slate.” Their findings are dominated by external CFO appointments. 
Because the effect of the type of the CFO appointment on stock price informativeness is 
ambiguous, I test both propositions. I posit that:  
Hypothesis 2A: The replacement of the chief financial officer (CFO) from the 
internal sources will have a significant effect on a firm’s information environment  
Hypothesis 2B: The replacement of the chief financial officer (CFO) from the 
external sources will have a significant effect on a firm’s information environment  
These hypotheses depend on critical definitions of “turnover,” “external,” and 
“internal.” Denis and Denis (2005) argued that when they employed the management 
change definition by Warner et al. (1988)38, they did not find any performance change 
surrounding the top management change. However, employing the definition of only 
forced departures, Denis and Denis (2005) find significant performance difference 
surrounding top management change. Therefore, I was cautious to follow Audit Analytics39 
reasoning for defining “internal” and “external” appointments. I define internal 
appointments as a replacement of CFO by someone inside the organization who worked 
for the company at least one year. External appointments are defined new hires from 
                                                          
38 Warner et al. (1988) include all type of management changes together such as “pursue other interests,” 
“take a position outside the firm,” “policy differences,” and “no reason given” as forced turnover. 
39 See http://www.auditanalytics.com/ 
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outside without any form of relationship with the hiring firm. The detailed definitions are 
given in the data section.  
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
I collected my data from Audit Analytics40 by reading 8-K filings of the sample 
firms. Following accounting and finance literature in this area, I only consider firms that 
have total assets of 10 million or more at the end of the fiscal year during my sample period. 
Following accounting literature, I exclude utility and financial firms (SICCD=31, 44, 45, 
46, and 47). A total of 2,764 firms experienced CFO change and meet the selection criteria 
in my sample period of 2005-2011. Some of the firms experienced multiple CFO 
replacement during the sample period. However, to keep the model estimation away from 
any sort of calculation bias, I consider each firm only once. Seventy-two percent (1,997 
firms) of the 2,764 firms experienced at least one CFO replacement over the 2005-2011 
period. To keep the effects of CFO replacement clean from any other management change, 
especially CEO change, I delete all the firms that experienced CEO change within three 
years surrounding the CFO change. For example, if a firm has experienced a CFO change 
in 2005, then it also experienced a CEO change either in 2004 or in 2006; I deleted that 
firm from my sample. I excluded any appointment in which the CFO has any sort of relation 
with the company prior to the appointment. For example, some CFOs worked as a 
consultant to the company for a short period of time, while some CFOs were in the audit 
team of the company.  
                                                          
40 Please refer to: http://auditanalytics.com/ 
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I define the “announcement date” as the earlier date between the filing date and the 
effective date of the CFO appointment. I excluded CFO replacements with special cases 
such as CFO change due to retirement, death, corporate restructuring, and mergers and 
acquisitions. Moreover, I also excluded any “interim” CFO responsibility. For firms that 
experience multiple replacements, I take only the latest replacement. I divided CFO 
replacements into two classes: internal appointments and external appointments. I define 
an appointment as an internal if any of these reasons are mentioned for CFO change: (i) 
assuming additional Position(s), (ii) position Change within Company, and (iii) returning 
to Prior Position41. For external appointments, I read 8-k filings and determine that if it 
does not meet any of the aforementioned criteria for internal CFO, then the CFO is hired 
from outside. Companies that have insider holdings and institutional holdings of more than 
100% are capped to 100%.  
I have used multiple data sources such as CRSP (Center for Research in Security 
Prices), COMPUSTAT, Audit Analytics, IBES (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System), 
and Thompson Reuters. Matching the firms based on various IDs, I lost a few more 
observations. My final sample size is 1,599 (843 internal appointments and 756 external 
appointments). The number of observations across models are different due to: a) using a 
sub-set of full sample, b) using more variables into some model than others, and c) not all 
variables having the data for the same years. I mention the number of observations (NOBS) 
used in the models in the result tables. 
                                                          
41 There are some other reasons mentioned such as mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and 
change in control. I excluded all these reasons. I made sure that my classification is accurate via contacting 
the Director of Research of Audit Analytics. He provided me with the same definition for internal and 
external appointments.  
76 
 
3.4 Methodology 
Studies like this traditionally use event study methodology in which a market model 
is used to estimate the systematic risk, or beta, in a bias-free estimation period. Then, the 
beta and mean standard error (MSE) are used to calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding the event. However, recent papers, such as Aktas et al. (2007)42 and Ahern 
(2009),43 show how event study methodology is seriously flawed. Aktas et al. (2007) show 
that when the estimation period is contaminated with unrelated events, standard OLS 
produces overestimated standard error of an individual firm’s returns. They argued that the 
actual return generating process has two-stages: high variance regime and low variance 
regime, instead of one regime assumed by the traditional event study methodology. Aktas 
et al. (2007) comment, “This result offers a clear econometric foundation for the loss of 
power of classical event study methodology when the estimation window is contaminated 
by unrelated events (p. 132).” Ahern (2009)44 shows that when firms are grouped based on 
certain characteristics, such as market anomalies (for example, size or higher price-
                                                          
42 Aktas, N., DeBondt, E., Cousin, J-G. 2007. Event studies with a contaminated period. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 13: 129-145. 
43 Ahern, K. R. 2009. Sample selection and event study estimation. Journal of Empirical Finance, 16: 466-
482. 
44 Ahern (2009) shows that when a market model is used to generate the abnormal returns in which only 
independent variable is the market returns (NYSE or NASDAQ) rather than leaving other firm-characteristic 
variables behind, the methodology produces omitted variable bias which causes significant statistical errors. 
He comments: “It is incorrect to expect to observe the average market return on any given day because returns 
are positively skewed. This implies that the mean is larger than the mode in the distribution and that for more 
than half of a sample of randomly chosen days, the observed return will be less than the mean return. Because 
of the skewness, omitted variable bias will generate incorrect predictions on average even when the model 
allows for an endogenously determined intercept term. This bias will persist even in large samples. Thus, 
because biases in standard asset pricing models are generated by omitted variables, it makes sense to look at 
samples grouped by these characteristics.” 
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earnings ratios), or corporate events, event study methodology may produce erroneous 
conclusions. Therefore, I refrain from using a controversial short-time based event study. 
I use two year measures (one year before and one year after) surrounding the CFO 
appointments. The reasons for utilizing long-term tools are manifold. First, a new CFO 
who changes the reporting system of the firm, can create more disclosure for the investors, 
and thus, add to new channels of information. Second, a new CFO also brings change to 
the firm’s operation by spinning off or divesting some of the subsidiaries and/or expanding 
and investing into new businesses. All these changes would not be visible in the short-term 
window surrounding the change. The real effect of such change needs more time (at least 
one year as I argue) to be reflected onto stock prices (or on tools of the information 
environment). Third, information environment takes into account all possible channels of 
generating, using, and disseminating information about a particular firm. While other 
studies depend on stock prices (assuming the market is efficient and thus, the sole 
determinant of future cash flows), information environment talks about the “information 
set” (as usually denoted by Ω) on which stock price depends on. Thus, information 
environment takes into account the greater (and more comprehensive) “input systems” of 
stock price.  
In addition, I argue that information environment quality-shift would be 
significantly different for two such types of appointments: interval hires via promotion 
versus hires from external sources. The “timing” of the CFO appointment is important. For 
example, a firm which is doing well for several years may not feel the need to change its 
CFO as urgently as a firm that has been performing poorly for the recent times. Thus, the 
“internal vs. external” and “stressed vs. sound” dynamics are important for firms going into 
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external labor markets and finding a new CFO which is time consuming and costly. Firms 
search the external labor market when the investors are expecting a replacement from 
outside.  Figure 1 provides an overview of my research design. 
To test hypothesis #1, I use the difference-in-difference (DND) approach to 
separate the effect of CFO change on the firm’s information environment. The following 
specification is used to test the effect of CFO change: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Where, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents a firm’s information environment proxies: idiosyncratic 
variances, synchronicity, number of analysts, analysts’ forecast error, and analysts’ 
forecast dispersion; i is for firm i and t=time (t=1 for post appointment and 0 for pre-
appointment period). 
Here, 𝛽3 is our interest, and it is determined as follows: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1) = (𝛼 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3) − (𝛼 + 𝛽2) =
𝛽1 + 𝛽3  (2) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0) = (𝛼 + 𝛽1) − 𝛼 = 𝛽1 (3) 
The DND is equation (2) minus equation (3): 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1) − [𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0) −
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0)] = 𝛽3  (4) 
I use firm-specific controls that may affect firm’s information environment in 
equation (1). I use insider holdings, institutional holdings, natural log of market value, 
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ROA, and standard deviation of ROA. The definitions of the control variables are given in 
the appendix.  
In choosing the control group (treatment=0 in the above specifications), I use two 
filtering processes: first, I identify firms in the same industry and similar size as the 
treatment firms. Second, I use propensity score-matched to identify the control sample. The 
two-step filtering process makes the process robust and produces unbiased statistical 
estimates45. Because I have collected data from several sources, I have to exclude those 
firms that do not have data for all the variables. In some cases, the number of control firms 
is lower than the treatment firms. I use the bootstrapping method to find the best group of 
controls. In this case, I randomly pick the number of control firms with replacement. Thus, 
each firm has the same probability to be included in the control. This method makes the 
controls free from any estimation bias and statistically accurate. I winsorize all the 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
Moreover, similar to Mian (2001), I separate the samples into -5, -4, -3, -2 and -1 
year, which means sample firms experiencing negative industry adjusted ROA for the last 
five years, four years, three years, two years, and one year prior to CFO replacement, 
respectively.  Industry adjusted ROA is calculated as the firm’s annual ROA minus the 
median ROA in the industry in which the firm belongs. In the first stage, I run logit 
regression in which distressed (value is 1 or 0) is the dependent variable and insider 
holdings, institutional holdings, market value, operating profit, and operating risk are 
                                                          
45 For a comprehensive discussion on traditional matching, such as same SIC and asset size and propensity 
based matching, please refer to “Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities” 
by Armstrong et al. (2010), Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 48. 
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independent variables. The logit regression was estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). In the second stage, equation (1) is run with other control variables in a 
paired sample setting. The same number of firms that experience CFO change and non-
CFO-change firms are put together based on their propensity scores given by the logit 
estimation at the first stage. I create fictitious CFO change dates for the firms (control 
group) that did not experience CFO change. Matching of the firms is based on the first-
stage filtering process mentioned earlier.   
To test hypothesis #2 (A&B), I use a similar specification as equation (1). Here, the 
model is run as a subset of equation (1) as I want to test whether internal or external CFO 
appointment matters more for the firms that experienced CFO replacements. Thus, the 
specifications have become as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
The results from equation (5) and (6) will be very similar, i.e., all the coefficients 
will have the same value with opposite signs and only the intercept will be different. 
Because in equation (5), INTERNAL is testing the effect from 0 to 1, in equation (6) it is 
just the opposite, from 1 to 0.  
Similar to Mian (2001), who associates the external appointment with the firm’s 
negative performance, I separate the samples into -5, -4, -3, -2 and -1 year, which means 
sample firms have been experiencing negative industry adjusted ROA for the last five 
years, four years, three years, two years, and one year prior to CFO change, respectively.  
This group of firms will be a sub-sample of the firms used in earlier specification (refer to 
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equation #4) and conditional on the output whether CFO change matters for firms. To test 
the effect for CFO change in a distressed firm, I add an indicator variable for distressed 
firms to equation (6) that takes a value of 1, if the firm is distressed and 0, otherwise46. The 
specification takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐿) + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7) 
I had to add the variable distressed even after separating the sample based on 
negative operating profit in order to create paired samples from the non-distressed class. 
In the first stage, I run logit regression in which distressed (value is 1 or 0) is the dependent 
variable and insider holdings, institutional holdings, market value, operating profit, and 
operating risk are independent variables. The logit regression was estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In the second stage, equation (6) is run with other 
control variables in a paired sample setting. The same number of good and distressed firms 
are put together based on their propensity scores given by the logit estimation at the first 
stage.  
In order to make sure that my hypothesis testing is robust and free from type II 
error, I run power of the test for the models. Type II error or β error is falsely accepting an 
incorrect null hypothesis (H0). 1-β indicates the power of the test which depends on three 
parameters: level of significance, sample size, and size effect. I use G*Power-3 program47 
by Faul et al. (2007) to compute the statistical power of the hypotheses. Post hoc power 
analyses (Cohen 1988) is used as “type” in the computation. 
                                                          
46 For example, if a firm is experiencing negative industry adjusted ROAs for the last five years before the 
CFO replacement, then “Distressed” equals 1, otherwise 0. 
47 Available at http://www.gpower.hhu.de/ 
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3.5 Results 
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics of information environment variables used 
in the study. In Panel A, I divide all five dependent variables into pre and post appointment. 
The results are mixed. Synchronicity and number of analysts increased during the post-
CFO replacement era which indicates a stronger or better information environment. 
However, idiosyncratic variances and analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion slightly 
increased after CFO replacement. All the information environment variables indicate a 
poorer state after the CFO replacement except synchronicity48 and number of analysts. A 
conclusive decision cannot be made about the status of the firm’s information environment 
from stock price informativeness variables. This phenomenon goes against the intuition. It 
may be the case that the negative effect of CFO change for some firms cancels the positive 
effect for some other firms. To isolate the type of effect, it is necessary to group firms based 
on some financial features. One such feature can be operating profit. Mian (2001) used 
industry adjusted operating profits, in addition to market reaction, to estimate the impact 
of CFO change and concludes that CFO replacement is preceded by a decline in operating 
performance. In the next section, I separate the distressed firms and  compare these firms 
with similar firms (matched by first, same SIC, and asset size, and second, by propensity 
score matching) to test the significance of CFO replacement. Intuitively, for good 
performing firms, changing CFO may be considered by the market as a routine 
phenomenon. However, for the distressed firms, the CFO replacement can be a big leap. I 
divide the distressed firms sample into five groups: firms that are producing industry 
                                                          
48 Synchronicity is still negative, however, less negative than the pre-scenario. That is how it is a positive 
change [=0.862-(-0.689)]. 
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adjusted negative operating profits for the last five years, for four years, and so on until the 
year before the CFO replacement.   
In Panel B of Table 3.2, I divide all the variables (both dependent and independent 
variables) into two groups based on the appointment types: internal appointments which is 
defined as a promotion to a CFO, and external appointments which is defined as a hire 
from outside the organization. The results are mixed: idiosyncratic variances are lower, and 
synchronicity and number of analysts are higher for internal appointment. This scenario 
means good information environment for internal appointments. Both analysts’ forecast 
errors and forecast dispersion is higher in internal appointment, which indicates poor 
information environment. In this case, I cannot conclusively say that internal appointment 
is better. Mian (2001) finds that external CFO appointment is associated with weaker 
operating performance. Among the independent variables, internal appointments are 
related with bigger firms and reduce the operating risk of the firms.  
 Table 3.3 represents the t-test between treatment (CFO change) and the control 
group firm. None of the information environment variables are significant between 
treatment group and control group except forecast dispersion (significant at the 10% level). 
The situation is similar for the independent variables. Therefore, I decided to group the 
firms based on their industry adjusted profit. A firm is considered distressed49 if it earns 
negative return relative to the industry in which it operates. Similar to Mian (2001), I 
divided distressed firms into five groups: firms earning negative returns for the last five 
years, four years, three years, two years, and one year before the CFO change. I find a 
                                                          
49 In this case, the firm’s annual industry adjusted ROA is negative, i.e., 𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 −
[𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐶,𝑡)] < 0 
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significant difference between the treatment group and control group. For example, the 
number of analysts is 6.31 (=EXP(1.814)) for treatment group and 4.53 (=EXP(1.510)) for 
the control group. In addition, analysts’ forecast error or forecast dispersion is statistically 
significant between treatment group and control group surrounding the years of CFO 
change. For firms that are distressed for the last four years, I did not find any significant 
information environment variable. I only report statistically significant values in the 
distressed sample (see lower part of Table 3). From now on, I will be focusing on both 
situations: all firms (sound and distressed) and only distressed firms. 
Table 3.4 outlines the expected signs for the multivariate analysis. Generally 
speaking, a positive sign indicates a better information situation, while a negative sign 
indicates a worse environment unless otherwise specified. A better information eco-system 
should have less noise, higher synchronous trading, presence of a large number of 
analysts,50 and less difference in opinion among the analysts. I should have positive signs 
for synchronicity and number of analysts and negative signs for idiosyncratic variance, 
analysts’ forecast error, and dispersion. 
Panel B of Table 3.4 lists the expected signs for the independent variables used in 
the multivariate setting under the five dependent variables (proxies for the firm’s 
information environment). The natural log of number of analysts is used both as a 
dependent variable and as an independent variable. Under the first two cases: idiosyncratic 
variance and synchronicity, it is used as one of the independent variables. Previous 
literature has used this type of setting (e.g. Chan, (year); Hameed, (year); Brockman, and 
                                                          
50 In this paper, I am assuming a higher number of analysts is tantamount to a quality information system. 
Even though a small group of analysts may produce quality forecasts, I am not going into that direction, and 
it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Yan, 2009) with IDV and synchronicity.  The relation between ROA and number of 
analysts is ambiguous. For a growing firm, ROA could be lower due to heavy investment 
into assets at the earlier years; however, the firm might be followed by a large number of 
analysts. This is especially true for firms in the IT industry. A similar ambiguity arises in 
the case of operational risk (SD of ROA). Therefore, a caution has to be exercised in 
explaining the effect of these two independent variables.    
Table 3.5 includes the estimation results of hypothesis 1, “The replacement of the 
chief financial officer (CFO) affects firm-specific information environment,” using 
equation 1 with the control variables. Control variables are selected based on the previous 
literature on information environment. In this specification, I have put all the firms, sound 
and distressed, in a paired sample setting (N=1599*2=3,198 in total). The variable of 
interest, post*treatment, is not significant in any of the information environment variables. 
The possible reason could be that mixing sound and distressed firms together offsets any 
effects that may exist, which is consistent with the univariate analysis done before. In the 
next section, I shall divide the firms into groups with one year increments: being distressed 
for the last 5 years until 1 year prior to the CFO replacement as I did in the univariate 
analysis.    
Consistent with Brockman and Yan (2009) and Chan and Hameed (2005), I also 
find that the natural log of the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, 
the natural log of market capitalization, operating profits, and operating risk are significant 
determinants of firm-specific information environment. Even though the sign of 
institutional holding is not consistent with Brockman and Yan (2009), it is consistent as 
per my specification. For example, institutional holdings increase synchronicity and the 
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number of analysts, however, reduces idiosyncratic volatility, and analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion. My findings are also consistent with the extant literature. Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2008) find that synchronicity (a proxy for information environment in their paper) 
increases in good information environments. Chan and Hammed (2005) find that the higher 
number of analysts incorporates greater market-wide information and lesser firm-specific 
information.  
In order to better understand the sign change, I compare block institutional 
holdings51 used by Brockman and Yan (2009) for the same group of firms used in my 
sample. Figure 3.2 shows a complete shift in the institutional holding from 1996-2001 in 
2005-2011. The mean and median shareholding by outside block holders were 15.99% and 
14.12%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 13.78% in 1996-2001. However, for the 
same group of firms, the mean and median are 78.51% and 83.13%, respectively, with a 
standard deviation of 18.86% in 2005-2011.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the shift in the nature of institutional 
holdings also shifts the behavior of the stock market, because nowadays, the majority of 
trades are done by institutions who are better equipped with less costly and more accurate 
information than some diffuse retail investors. Institutional trading reduces (increases) 
idiosyncratic volatility (synchronicity), which makes sense because institutional investors 
trade based on information. Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) show that non-
informational liquidity driven (or herding) investors’ trades increase market volatility, 
                                                          
51 Block holding data are available only for the 1996-2001 period in Wharton database. Brockman et al. 
(2009) used the same time frame in their study.  
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following stock price declines, whereas informed (or contrarian) investors’ trades reduce 
market volatility, following stock price increases.    
In Table 3.6, I find that the replacement of the CFO brings significant change for 
firms that are suffering for longer periods of time, such as the last 5 years, in reducing 
idiosyncratic variances and forecast error. Idiosyncratic variance reduces by 0.019 
(significant at the 5% level) units when firms replace their CFOs. In addition, analysts’ 
forecast errors reduces by 0.508 (significant at the 1%) level when distressed firms replace 
their CFOs. Synchronicity, the natural log of the number of analysts and forecast dispersion 
is not significant. Out of five variables, two information environment variables show 
significance. The independent variables are in line with the expected signs outlined in 
Table 4. For example, the presence of analysts decreases idiosyncratic variance or noise in 
the market. The presence of about three (2.72=EXP(1)) analysts reduces 0.008 weekly 
idiosyncratic variance. Moreover, bigger firms produce higher synchronicity and attract a 
large number of analysts. The natural log of market capitalization increases both 
synchronous trading in the market and the natural log of the number of analysts (both of 
the variables are significant at 1% level). Because, both the market capitalization (right 
hand side variable) and number of analysts (left hand side variable) are in log format, I can 
explain the effect as a 1% increase in the market capitalization, which will increase the 
chance of being followed by one more analyst by 0.42%.  
Table 3.7 includes the effect of CFO replacement for firms that are suffering for the 
last four years prior to CFO replacement. Out of five variables, only one information 
environment variable shows significance (at 10% level) due to the CFO change.  
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Insider holdings significantly reduce the forecast errors and hence, contribute 
positively to the firm’s information environment. Institutional holdings remain a strong 
element for improving a firm’s suffering information environment. For example, in four 
out of the five parameters of information environment quality, institutional holdings are 
significant. It reduces idiosyncratic variance and analysts forecast dispersion and improves 
(attracts) synchronicity (analysts). Large firms improve a firm’s information environment 
(the natural log of the market value is significantly positive at 1% level under 
synchronicity) and attract a large number of analysts (the natural log of the market value is 
statistically positive at 1% level under the natural log of the number of analysts). All other 
independent variables are in line with the expected signs outlined in Table 4.  
Table 3.8 produces the estimation results for firms that are suffering operationally 
for the last three years. The interaction variable, post*treatment is significant at the 10% 
level and 1% level under synchronicity and the natural log of the number of analysts, 
respectively. In both cases, replacing the CFO improves synchronicity by 0.212 and attracts 
1.25 (=EXP(0.221)) analysts. Even though idiosyncratic variances and analysts’ forecast 
errors have the correct sign, they are not significant. Analysts’ forecast dispersion is neither 
significant nor does it have the correct sign. Both the institutional holdings and market 
capitalization remain strong determinants of the firm’s information environment.  
Table 3.9 and 3.10 report the extent of information environment improvement in 
post-CFO turnover for firms that earn negative industry ROA for the last two years and for 
the prior year of CFO change, respectively.  CFO turnover for firms that earn negative 
ROA for the two years prior does not improve the information environment of those firms. 
Firms should allow CFOs to improve the performance for at least two years before 
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replacing them. It can be seen from the above discussion that firms benefit from replacing 
a CFO who has produced negative earnings for the last consecutive three or more years.  
Table 3.11 reports the estimation results of hypothesis 2A, “The replacement of the 
chief financial officer (CFO) from internal sources will have a significant effect on a firm’s 
information environment”. In this table, I include all the firms that have CFO change and 
based on the definition provided in the data section, I divide the CFOs into internal and 
external. If, according to the hypothesis, incumbents promoted to CFOs have a significant 
impact on a firm’s information environment, the interaction term (internal CFO*post) 
should be significant. However, the interaction term is not significant under any of the 
models. Institutional holding is a significant determinant of a firm’s information 
environment as it is significant with the correct signs under four out of five measures. For 
big firms, information is easy to access. Coefficients for ln of market capitalization show 
this phenomenon. For example, idiosyncratic variances, analysts’ forecast errors, and 
analysts’ dispersions reduce significantly, whereas synchronicity and number of analysts 
following firms have increased significantly.  
Table 3.12 reports the estimation results of hypothesis 2B, “The replacement of the 
chief financial officer (CFO) from external sources will have a significant effect on the 
firm’s information environment”. Like the previous results (in reference to Table 3.6), the 
interaction term (=External CFO*post) captures the post effect of external CFO turnover 
on the firm’s information environment. Neither internal nor external CFO turnover affects 
the firm’s informativeness under the current specification. 
 Insider holdings and institutional holdings are significant determinants of the 
information environment. Although institutional holdings were significant at the earlier 
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specification, insider holdings were weaker in the current setting. Intuitively, this makes 
sense because insiders know whether an incumbent would be a better CFO, and if not, they 
go for a new hire. The natural log of market capitalization is significant (four of them 
significant at the 1% level and one at the 10% level) in all five models with the correct 
sign. Big companies increase the synchronicity, attract more analysts to follow those firms 
(Alford and Berger 1999), and decrease idiosyncratic variance, analysts’ forecast errors, 
and dispersion. Like before, I split the sample into sound and distressed firms based on 
their operating profits for the last five years. I use the same specification as used in Table 
9 and 10, however, with an additional variable, distressed, which is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 for being a distressed firm and 0 for sound firms. I need this variable 
to capture the effect of being distressed in a pool of sound and distressed firms. As seen in 
Table 9, placing all sound and distressed firms together is not a suitable idea to extract the 
effect of CFO replacement on a firm’s information environment.  
Table 3.13 includes the results for the firms that earn negative industry operating 
profits for the last five years (-5 years). I expected the CFOs hiring from outside of the 
firms with fresh knowledge to the status-quo of the firm’s operation would significantly 
change the firm’s information environment. Intuitively, for firms that are suffering for five 
years, an internal CFO cannot do much to earn a positive profit, therefore, a new CFO can 
bring the expected change. The overall market does not adjust their expectations after the 
CFO change because the interaction term, post*external, is not significant for idiosyncratic 
variance and synchronicity. The appointment of an external CFO significantly (at the 5% 
level) reduces the analysts’ forecast errors by 0.371 units. My results are consistent with 
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that of Mian52 (2001) who finds that for poorly performing firms, replacement of the CFO 
from outside placates upset investors in the shorter term (using event window of -1 to 0 
day), however, over the longer term, such as -250 to -2 days or -500 to -2 days, investors 
do not care (insignificant CARs). I anticipated that after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
the investor reaction behavior might have changed with regards to CFO replacement. In 
the pre-SOX era, the CFOs were not as important as they are in the post-SOX53 era. 
Table 3.14 reports findings for the firms that are distressed for four years before 
they replace their CFOs. Being a distressed firm increases noise and decreases 
synchronicity in the market, distressed is significant at 5% under IDV and is significant at 
1% under synchronicity. When those firms replace their CFOs, only synchronicity (a proxy 
for the firm’s information environment) responds to such an event (significant at 10% 
level). All other information environment variables are non-responsive to the CFO change. 
Institutional holdings and market capitalization are strongly significant (most of them 1% 
level) throughout all the models.  
Table 3.15 reports the results of distressed firms that earned negative industry 
adjusted ROA for the last three consecutive years. For firms that earn negative returns for 
the last three years, CFOs hired from external sources would improve the information 
environment of the firms. Both number of analysts and their earnings forecast errors are 
impacted by the external CFO hires. For example, five (=EXP(1.61)) more analysts start 
                                                          
52 Mian (2001) data covers 1984-1997.    
53 For this reason, there are only a handful of studies on CFO replacement or turnover in the pre-SOX period 
as opposed to CEO, President or Chairman. Mian (2001) does an anatomy of CFO replacement; Aier et al. 
(2005) and Geiger and North (2006) investigate the relation between accounting restatement and CFO 
turnover. However, their data are pre-SOX as well—Aier et al. 1997-2002 and Geiger and North 1994-2000. 
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following a firm after it replaced its CFO from external sources. Also, 0.32 units of an 
earnings forecast error is reduced from an external CFO appointments vis-à-vis internal 
appointment.  
From earlier results (refer to Table 3.9 and Table 3.10), it is seen that CFO change 
(including both types, internal and external) does not matter for firms earning negative 
returns for the last two years. CFO change only matters for firms that earn negative ROAs 
for the last five, four, and three years. External CFO effects are conditional on overall CFO 
change. Therefore, I only show external CFO effect on firm information environment for -
5, -4 and -3 years.     
3.6 Conclusion 
Under Section-302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, both the CEO and CFO are 
held personally accountable for the integrity of a firm’s financial statements and 
particularly, its earnings. The CFO of a firm takes responsibility for the financial running 
of a firm. Moreover, CFOs are ideal candidates for future CEOs (see Matsunaga et al., 
2008). Therefore, it is natural to expect that when there is a CFO replacement (either from 
an internal or external source), a market repercussion happens. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no research available which discusses how category (internal vs. 
external) of CFO appointments affects firm-specific information environment quality. The 
contribution of this study is new in that I explore a dimension of research, which analyzes 
a firm’s information environment and market response to an important firm-specific 
event—CFO change. A comprehensive study on CFO replacement was first done by Mian 
(2001) based on the data of 2,227 sample firms in 1984-1997. Almost all the papers in 
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economics, accounting, and management literature talk about the replacement effects of 
CEOs, chairmen, presidents, COOs (chief operating officer) etc.  
My study ties an important firm-event with the information environment in which 
the firms are operating. I use established tools that are used by extant research to define the 
improvement in stock price informativeness. I posit that the long-term tool, information 
environment, effectively captures the overall market reaction (or adjustment) toward the 
CFO replacement better than short-term tool, event study. There is no significant difference 
between pre and post replacement in events nearest to the quarterly analysts’ forecast 
dispersion surrounding the CFO replacement. In some instances, I find significant market 
behavior change for pre and post CFO replacement when tools, such as idiosyncratic 
volatility (using daily stock price data), synchronous trading behavior, the number of 
analysts’ following a firm over a year, and +/-180 day analysts’ absolute forecast errors, 
are applied. However, the results are not consistent and I cannot conclusively say that CFO 
change impacts a firm’s information environment.  
My findings are robust because I use two filters in choosing the right group of firms 
and use propensity score matching to match the similar firms but without CFO change. In 
addition, I use five established measures of information environment variables. I was 
unable to measure the informativeness, which is consistently a significant determinant of 
information environment across all the models. In a few specifications, I find at least one 
or two information environment variable(s). However, none of them are consistent over all 
the models. The information environment of a firm incorporates the eco-system of 
information. The environment can be affected by both the external mechanism and internal 
mechanism of firms. For example, the proposed Silicon Valley based idea of Long-Term 
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Stock Exchange54 (LTSE) can change the whole dynamics of evaluating firms or 
executives based on the short term milestones such as quarterly or annual performances. 
Because, LTSE will be built on an incentive structure that will focus on the long-term goals 
rather than short-term metrics. The CFO alone may not be able to bring the change in it in 
a short period of time. The possible extension of this research could be to include more 
executives and board members. In addition, a time series study may be able to catch the 
change in the firm information environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 For more information, please refer to: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-12/silicon-
valley-s-audacious-plan-to-create-a-new-stock-exchange 
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Figure 3.1 Research Design 
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Figure 3.2 Comparison between institutional holding (block holding by outsiders) of a 
group of firms in 1996-2001 with institutional holding of the same group of firms in 
2005-2011  
The left panel shows the distribution of institutional block holding data used by Brockman 
et al. (2009) for 437 firms matched with my sample. Comparing with the right panel of my 
sample, we can see that the distribution has shifted completely. During Brockman’s et al. 
(2009) sample period, the distribution was right skewed with mean=14.12%, whereas, in 
my sample period it is left skewed with mean=78.51%.  
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Information Environment Proxy Related Literature Relationship 
Idiosyncratic variance (IDV): it captures the firm-
specific component in stock price, i.e., the relative 
price impact which is not captured by market and 
industry return. Thus, it is the degree to which firm-
specific information is impounded into stock price 
(Brockman and Yan 2009). Following Brockman and 
Yan (2009), to calculate idiosyncratic volatility (IDV), 
I estimate the following regression using weekly 
contemporaneous and lagged market and industry 
returns as independent variables for each firm for one-
year time period (both for pre- and post-
announcement): 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the 
residuals of the above regression.  
Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2008), 
and Brockman and 
Yan (2009)  
Higher IDV means more noise in the market. 
A well designed portfolio (i.e., investing in 
stocks that have negative correlations) can 
significantly reduce the IDV. Gul et al. 
(2011) argue that more information into 
public reporting crowds out private 
information. Moreover, public reporting is 
less frequent and has less impact on daily 
returns than private information, thus, it 
reduces firm-specific variance. Therefore, 
higher quality of earnings should increase 
public information and decrease private 
information (Gul et al. 2011). In my case, 
lower IDV (or noise) means higher 
information environment quality. 
Table 3.1 Definition of Information Environment Variables 
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Synchronicity (SYNCITY): Invented by Morck et al. 
(2000) in studying synchronous movement of stock 
returns in emerging economies. The firm level weekly 
return is regressed on market and industry return (the 
same equation in the case of IDV). The higher the R2 
the higher the synchronicity meaning that individual 
stock returns are highly correlated with the stock 
market. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Brockman 
and Yan added industry return, lagged industry return, 
and lagged market return to the original regression. 
Finally, it is scaled as following so that it can take 
negative values and can be used in statistical tests that 
depend on normality assumption: 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑅2
1 − 𝑅2
) 
Morck et al. 
(2000), Piotroski 
and Roulstone 
(2004), Chan and 
Hameed (2006), 
Brockman and Yan 
(2009) 
In the case of emerging economies, Morck et 
al. (2000) find higher synchronous trading of 
stocks. Moreover, they also show that in the 
US stock market synchronicity reduced over 
time. However, in the last year of their 
sample period (in 1995) about 60% of the 
stocks moved together. Chan and Hameed 
(2006) find that the presence of security 
analysts lessen the firm-specific noise. They 
argue that if firm-specific price movements 
reflect noise then the presence of security 
analysts reduces the noise and consequently 
increases the synchronicity (higher number 
of analysts is positively related with 
synchronicity). Therefore, higher 
synchronicity means higher information 
environment quality. 
Number of Analysts: Natural log of number of analysts 
following a firm. 
Bhushan (1989), 
Alford and Berger 
(1999) and Chan 
and Hameed 
(2006) 
The higher number of analysts means a better 
information environment. In order to sell the 
earning reports to its own customers, each 
analyst firm tries to incorporate as much 
information as possible from accurate 
sources. On the contrary, for a poor firm’s 
information environment the number of 
analysts is lower. 
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Analysts’ forecast error: I compute earnings forecast 
error as the absolute value of the difference between 
the median analyst’s quarterly forecast within +/-180 
days surrounding to CFO replacement announcement 
and actual quarterly earnings, scaled by the firm’s EPS. 
Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) and Givoly 
and Lakonishok 
(1979) 
The lower forecast error means quality 
information environment. Because when the 
information channels are good, analysts can 
acquire quality information without much 
noise. “Consensus” forecast can only be 
possible if all the analysts following a firm 
have the same information. Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) argue that price informativeness 
depends more on consistent forecast over the 
time rather that accuracy. 
Analysts’ forecast dispersion: it is measured as the 
standard deviation of earnings forecasts across analysts 
prior to a CFO change announcement, normalized by 
the firm’s fiscal year-end stock price.  
Barron et al. 
(1998), Barry and 
Jennings 1992 
Barron et al. (1998) show that analysts 
forecast dispersion is an increasing function 
of uncertainty and a decreasing function of 
consensus. Therefore, the lower the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts the better the 
information environment. Lower dispersion 
means analysts following a firm have similar 
private (or privileged) information about the 
firm. Diversity among analysts increases if 
information is distributed unequally even if 
the aggregate private information is held 
constant (Barry and Jennings 1992). 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The following table includes descriptive statistics of Information Environment Variables 
and Control Variables. I use a one-year window surrounding the CFO appointment date in 
calculating information environment variables: idiosyncratic variance, synchronicity, 
natural logarithm of number of analysts, forecast errors, and forecast dispersions. The 
values for control variables for pre- and-post appointments are from the earliest and latest 
year of CFO change, respectively. The reason the number of post-appointment 
observations is smaller than pre-appointment is due to some firms that went bankrupt or 
stopped trading after the CFO change. Idiosyncratic variance increases after the 
appointment, which indicates a poorer information environment. Synchronicity increases 
by 0.173=-0.689-(-0.862), which is statistically significant. The natural log of the number 
of analysts has increased. Both of the increases indicate better information environment. 
Analysts’ forecast error increased, whereas, forecast dispersion stayed the same. Holdings 
by insiders decreased, while institutional holdings have increased. Natural logarithm of 
market value increased slightly after the CFO appointment. Operating performance has 
improved (with a lower negative number) and standard deviation of ROA has decreased. 
In regards to internal and external appointments, all the parameters indicate somewhat 
poorer information environment for external appointment, except analysts’ forecast error. 
Insider holdings, institutional holdings, and market value of the CFO changed firms 
decreased. Operating performance has dampened and standard deviation of operating 
performance has increased. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. Type II error or β error is falsely accepting an incorrect null 
hypothesis (H0). 1-β indicates the power of the test which depends on three parameters: 
level of significance, sample size and size effect. I use G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. 
(2007) (available at http://www.gpower.hhu.de/) to compute the statistical power of the 
hypotheses. Post hoc power analyses (Cohen 1988) is used as “type” in the computation. 
Panel A: Comparative statistics between pre and post appointments 
 Pre 
Appointment 
Post 
Appointment 
Mean diff. 
(post-pre) 
t-
value 
Power 
of the 
test 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
Idiosyncratic 
variance 0.054 0.028 0.055 0.031 0.0007 0.50 N/A 
Synchronicity (0.862) 1.036 (0.689) 1.082 0.1731*** 3.26 0.825 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 2.037 0.947 2.056 0.955 0.0198 0.42 N/A 
Forecast errors 0.058 0.695 0.065 0.682 0.0074 0.20 N/A 
Forecast 
dispersion 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.0002 0.28 N/A 
Insider holdings 0.155 0.251 0.145 0.246 -0.0094 -0.76 N/A 
Institutional 
holdings 0.687 0.247 0.695 0.244 0.0082 0.67 N/A 
Ln of market 
value 20.380 1.843 20.470 1.872 0.0901 0.97 N/A 
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ROA (0.018) 0.194 (0.004) 0.180 0.0148* 1.58 0.584 
SD of ROA 0.030 0.038 0.029 0.038 -0.0012 -0.63 N/A 
Observations 825.000 774.000    
 
Panel B: Comparative statistics between internal and external appointments 
 Internal 
Appointment 
External 
Appointment 
Mean diff. 
(INT-EXT) 
t-
value 
Power 
of the 
test 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
Idiosyncratic 
variance 0.052 0.034 0.058 0.028 -0.0057*** -2.56 0.635 
Synchronicity (0.612) 1.137 (0.775) 1.012 0.1631** 2.11 0.676 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 2.148 0.958 1.959 0.940 0.1898*** 2.78 0.869 
Forecast errors 0.166 0.760 (0.004) 0.656 0.1698*** 2.74 0.651 
Forecast 
dispersion 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.014 0.0002 0.13 N/A 
Insider holdings 0.148 0.255 0.140 0.234 0.0081 0.46 N/A 
Institutional 
holdings 0.707 0.231 0.682 0.258 0.0253 1.43 N/A 
Ln of market 
value 20.815 1.992 20.085 1.652 0.7300*** 5.57 1.000 
ROA 0.005 0.176 (0.013) 0.184 0.0185 1.43 N/A 
SD of ROA 0.026 0.036 0.032 0.040 -0.0063** 2.29 0.707 
Observations 406.000 368.000    
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Table 3.3 T-test of Information Environment Variables 
This table includes t-tests between treated and controlled firms. There is no significant 
difference between the two groups. Because the number of control firms is lower than the 
treatment firms, 801 firms (=1599-798) are picked from the control group by bootstrapping 
method (random sampling with replacements). Although there are no significant 
differences among firms that experienced CFO change and firms that have similar features 
without any CFO change, firms that experienced negative earnings for the last few years 
consecutively showed significant differences. Four measures of information environment 
quality proxy variables show significant differences over the past 3-5 years of consecutive 
negative ROAs. Similar to Mian (2001), I calculated industry adjusted ROA over the last 
five years. Therefore, it is necessary to separate the distressed firms to determine the impact 
of CFO change on information environment. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
All firms Mean t-test Significant? 
Power of 
the test 
Variable 
Treated 
(N=1599) 
Control 
(N=1599) 
t-value p>|t|  
 
Idiosyncratic variance 0.055 0.054 0.94 0.349 No N/A 
Synchronicity (0.778) (0.776) (0.06) 0.952 No N/A 
Ln of no. of analysts 2.046 2.088 (1.27) 0.205 No N/A 
Forecast errors 0.061 0.032 1.11 0.267 No N/A 
Forecast dispersion 0.007 0.006 1.65 0.100 * 0.643 
Insider holdings 0.150 0.150 (0.03) 0.974 No N/A 
Institutional holdings 0.691 0.695 (0.43) 0.668 No N/A 
Ln of market value 20.424 20.475 (0.76) 0.447 No N/A 
ROA 0.011 (0.007) (0.65) 0.515 No N/A 
SD of ROA 0.030 0.029 0.54 0.589 No N/A 
-5 Years       
Idiosyncratic variance 0.078 0.088 (2.35) 0.020 ** 0.757 
Ln of no. of analysts 1.814 1.510 3.26 0.001 *** 0.822 
Forecast dispersion 0.013 0.009 1.71 0.088 * 0.665 
-4 Years       
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-3 Years       
Ln of no. of analysts 1.789 1.637 2.57 0.010 *** 0.594 
Forecast errors 0.055 (0.068) 1.99 0.047 ** 0.635 
Forecast dispersion 0.013    0.009 3.00 0.003 *** 0.749 
-2 Years       
Ln of no. of analysts 1.805 1.695 2.06 0.039 ** 0.662 
Forecast dispersion 0.012 .009 3.37 0.001 **** 0.850 
-1 Year       
Forecast errors 0.044 -0.040 1.67 0.095 * 0.651 
Forecast dispersion 0.011 0.009 2.35 0.019 ** 0.758 
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Table 3.4 Expected Signs 
The following table includes the expected signs from the multivariate analysis. From 
consultation with the existing literature, I posit that if a firm employs a new CFO, the 
appointment should reduce the noise in the market hence the idiosyncratic variance. The 
relation between IDV and synchronicity is negative (lower errors or IDV increases R2 and 
vice versa in the equation presented in Table 3.1, row 1). The higher number of analysts 
would increase the information availability in the market. If the information eco-system is 
good, then both the analysts’ forecast error and dispersion should be lower. The presence 
of a higher number of analysts reduces idiosyncratic variance and increases synchronicity. 
The higher proportion of ownership by insiders and institutions increase the quality of the 
information environment. Typically, a big firm has a better information environment due 
to having a higher number of analysts following the firm, an internal audit department, 
regular press release and other aid to quality information. The relationship between ROA 
and the number of analysts is not clear due to the fact that both good firms and distressed 
firms can be followed by a large number of analysts. The volatility of earnings (SD of 
ROA) is positively related with IDV, forecast error and dispersion and negatively related 
to synchronicity. The expected sign under the number of analysts is ambiguous.     
Panel A: Dependent variables   
Proxy variables to firm’s information 
environment Expected sign Description 
Idiosyncratic variance (or noise or diversifiable 
risk) 
- 
Improve the info. 
Environment 
Synchronicity + 
Improve the info. 
Environment 
Ln of number of analysts + 
Improve the info. 
Environment 
Forecast error - 
Improve the info. 
Environment 
Forecast dispersion - 
Improve the info. 
Environment 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Expected Sign 
Dep. Variables  
Ln of no. of analysts† -, + 
IDV should go 
down and sync. 
should go up 
Insider holdings -,+,+,-,-   
Institutional holdings -,+,+,-,-   
Ln of market value -,+,+,-,-   
ROA -,+,?,-,-   
SDROA +,-,?,+,+   
† (note: previous literature uses this variable with idiosyncratic variance and 
synchronicity in similar type of specification) 
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Table 3.5 Multivariate Analysis (All Firms) 
This table includes multivariate analysis using all firms together. Propensity score 
matching is used to pick the same number of control firms as treatment firms. In the first 
stage, a logit regression was run in which an indicator variable (CFO change firm=1, 
otherwise=0) is used as a dependent variable and the number of analysts, insider holdings, 
institutional holdings, market capitalization, earnings and volatility of earnings are used as 
independent variables. In the second stage, the same group of independent variables along 
with “post,” “treatment,” and “post*treatment” are used to test their impacts on information 
environment proxy variables: idiosyncratic variance, synchronicity, natural log of the 
number of analysts, analysts forecast errors and forecast dispersion. The variable of interest 
in this framework is the interaction term between post and treatment (=Post*Treatment). 
Post is an indicator variable taking value of 1 for the period after the CFO change, 
otherwise it takes a value of 0. Treatment is also an indicator variable which takes a value 
of 1 for being a firm from the CFO change group, otherwise it takes a value of 0. The 
interaction term tells us the nature and significance of effect a CFO change has on the 
firm’s information environment. Even though post is significant at the 1% level under 
“synchronicity” the interaction term is not significant in any of the models. The number of 
analysts should increase the quality of firm’s information environment, i.e., it should have 
a negative coefficient under the first model and positive coefficient under synchronicity. 
Although the number of analysts does not have the correct sign under IDV, the other 
independent variables have the correct signs. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Type II error or 
β error is falsely accepting an incorrect null hypothesis (H0). 1-β indicates the power of the 
test which depends on three parameters: level of significance, sample size and size effect. 
I use 5% level of significance, actual sample size and size effect from R2 in calculating 1-
β. I use the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007) (available at 
http://www.gpower.hhu.de/) to compute the statistical power of the hypotheses. Post hoc 
power analyses (Cohen 1988) is used as “type” in the computation. 
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance Synchronicity 
Ln of no. 
of analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post -0.00002 0.131*** 0.010 -0.035 0.00047 
 (-0.01) (2.89) (0.33) (-0.94) -0.710 
Treatment 0.000 0.006 -0.019 0.013 0.001 
 (-0.29) (0.13) (-0.61) (0.35) (1.23) 
Post*Treatment 0.002 0.013 -0.019 0.040 0.00008 
 (1.10) (0.20) (-0.42) (0.76) (0.09) 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 0.005*** 0.053**    
 (6.85) (2.14)    
Insider 
holdings 0.000 -0.211*** 0.140*** 0.048 -0.002** 
 (-0.16) (-3.15) (2.92) (0.88) (-2.27) 
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Institutional 
holdings -0.019*** 0.424*** 0.725*** 0.068 -0.009*** 
 (-9.49) (5.77) (14.31) (1.10) (-7.94) 
Ln of market 
value -0.007*** 0.203*** 0.338*** -0.016* -0.001*** 
 (-19.77) (15.85) (47.79) (-1.89) (-8.63) 
ROA -0.023*** 0.247** -0.484*** 0.458*** -0.017*** 
 (-8.38) (2.44) (-6.78) (5.29) (-10.59) 
SD of ROA 0.110*** -0.655 -0.127 -0.063 0.047*** 
 (8.20) (-1.32) (-0.37) (-0.15) (5.97) 
Constant 0.194*** -5.338*** -5.367*** 0.322* 0.038*** 
 (30.98) (-23.11) (-38.41) (1.89) (12.32) 
NOBS 3,198 3,198 3,198 2,904 2,850 
R-squared 0.345 0.256 0.561 0.016 0.247 
Power of the 
test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 3.6 Multivariate analysis (-5 years) 
Similar to Mian (2001), I separate the firms that are producing negative industry adjusted 
ROA for the last 5 years prior to CFO replacement. Propensity score matching is used to 
pick the same number of control firms as treatment firms. In the first stage, a logit 
regression was run in which an indicator variable (CFO changed firm=1, otherwise=0) is 
used as a dependent variable and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional 
holdings, market capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings are used as independent 
variables. In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned 
in Table 3.5. Out of five proxies of information environment, two are significantly affected 
by the CFO turnover. For example, idiosyncratic variance is reduced by 0.019 unit for firms 
which have replaced their CFOs vis-à-vis firms that did not replace. In addition, analysts’ 
forecast errors have reduced for the firms which replaced their CFOs. Other independent 
variables are in line with the expected signs outlined in Table 3.4. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The power of the test is computed by the G*Power 3 by Faul et al. (2007).   
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.026*** 0.10  0.04  0.393*** 0.00  
  (4.71) (0.92) (0.48) (3.31) (1.37) 
Treatment 0.000  -0.090 0.150  0.298** 0.005*   
  (0.78) (-0.75) (1.58) (2.44) (1.91) 
Post*Treatment -0.019** -0.080 0.030  -0.508*** (0.00) 
  (-2.48) (-0.53) (0.26) (-3.03) (-0.80)    
Ln of no. of 
analysts 
-0.008** 0.03                    
  (-2.41) (0.41)                   
Insider holdings 0.010 -0.030 0.100  -0.430** 0.00  
 (-1.64) (-0.19) (0.75) (-2.39) (0.60) 
Institutional 
holdings 
-0.041*** 0.559*** 0.844*** 0.110  -0.008*   
 (-4.15) (2.81) (5.80) (0.52) (-1.96)    
Ln of market value 0.000  0.262*** 0.419*** (0.00) 0.00  
 (0.33) (6.28) (16.75) (-0.12) (-0.06)    
ROA -0.010 0.317* -0.406*** 0.300* -0.013*** 
 (-1.54) (1.91) (-3.24) (1.70) (-3.65)    
SD of ROA -0.060 -0.320 0.90  -0.610 0.000  
  (-1.41) (-0.37) (1.42) (-0.63) (0.11) 
Constant 0.099*** -6.332*** -7.166*** 0.030 0.010  
  (2.71) (-8.65) (-15.88) (-0.05) (0.78) 
NOBS 402 402 402 346 336 
R-squared 0.203 0.339 0.62 0.066 0.114 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.960 0.999 
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Table 3.7 Multivariate Analysis (-4 years) 
Similar to Mian (2001), I separate the firms that are producing negative industry adjusted 
ROA for the last 4 years prior to CFO replacement. Propensity score matching is used to 
pick the same number of control firms as treatment firms. In the first stage, a logit 
regression was run in which an indicator variable (CFO change firm=1, otherwise=0) is 
used as dependent and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, 
market capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings are used as independent 
variables. In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned 
in Table 3.5. Out of five information environment proxies, one is marginally affected (at 
10%) by the CFO turnover. For example, analysts’ forecast errors have reduced by 0.275 
units for the firms which replaced their CFOs. Other independent variables are in line with 
the expected signs outlined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The power of the test 
is computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.000 0.072 -0.024 0.232** -0.004*   
  (0.11) (0.75) (-0.33) (2.19) (-1.90)    
Treatment -0.001 -0.145 -0.002 0.127 -0.002 
  (-0.33) (-1.49) (-0.03) (1.17) (-0.76)    
Post*Treatment 0.004 0.030 0.033 -0.275* 0.005 
  (0.76) (0.22) (0.33) (-1.83) (1.43) 
Ln of no. of analysts -0.003 0.188***                   
  (-1.27) (3.50)                   
Insider holdings -0.001 -0.242 -0.054 -0.535*** 0.003 
 (-0.11) (-1.42) (-0.48) (-3.27) (0.82) 
Institutional holdings -0.023*** 0.336** 0.767*** 0.001 -0.014*** 
 (-3.57) (2.14) (6.67) (0.01) (-3.83)    
Ln of market value 0.000 0.196*** 0.364*** -0.028 -0.001 
 (0.25) (5.79) (17.93) (-0.90) (-1.21)    
ROA -0.023*** 0.199 -0.513*** 0.241 -0.015*** 
 (-3.92) (1.39) (-4.69) (1.52) (-4.17)    
SD of ROA 0.052* -1.804** 0.302 -2.255** 0.046**  
  (1.74) (-2.42) (0.53) (-2.55) (2.49) 
Constant 0.079*** -5.166*** -5.836*** 0.66 0.035*** 
  (3.24) (-8.63) (-15.57) (1.11) (2.78) 
NOBS 632 632 632 538 530 
R-squared 0.119 0.28 0.515 0.046 0.176 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972 1.000 
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Table 3.8 Multivariate Analysis (-3 years) 
Similar to Mian (2001), I separate the firms that are producing negative industry adjusted 
ROA for the last 3 years prior to CFO replacement. Propensity score matching is used to 
pick the same number of control firms as treatment firms. In the first stage, a logit 
regression was run in which an indicator variable (CFO change firm=1, otherwise=0) is 
used as dependent and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, 
market capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings are used as independent 
variables. In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned 
in Table 3.5. Out of five proxies of information environment variables, two proxies are 
affected by the CFO turnover. For example, synchronous trading of stocks of the distressed 
companies increases after they replace their CFOs. In addition, more analysts are attracted 
after distressed companies change their CFOs. Other independent variables are in line with 
the expected signs outlined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The power of the test 
is computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance Synchronicity 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.007** (0.12) -0.169*** 0.03 0.00 
 (2.39) (-1.47) (-2.86) (0.39) (1.21) 
Treatment 0.00 -0.203** 0.03 0.144* 0.003** 
 (1.13) (-2.55) (0.52) (1.68) (1.98) 
Post*Treatment (0.00) 0.212* 0.221*** (0.06) 0.00 
 (-0.48) (1.86) (2.65) (-0.50) (0.23) 
Ln of no. of analysts 0.00 0.074*    
 (-0.15) (1.68)    
Insider holdings 0.00 (0.06) (0.09) -0.253* (0.00) 
 (0.71) (-0.51) (-0.91) (-1.81) (-1.00) 
Institutional holdings -0.023*** 0.374*** 0.863*** (0.09) -0.009*** 
 (-4.72) (2.80) (9.19) (-0.58) (-3.46) 
Ln of market value 0.000 0.261*** 0.341*** 0.02 -0.002*** 
 (-1.19) (9.20) (20.43) (0.70) (-4.26) 
ROA -0.018*** 0.332** -0.337*** 0.479*** -0.018*** 
 (-3.76) (2.51) (-3.60) (3.57) (-6.94) 
SD of ROA 0.076*** -1.202* 0.904* (0.35) 0.025* 
 (3.01) (-1.71) (1.86) (-0.47) (1.88) 
Constant 0.096*** -6.272*** -5.516*** (0.27) 0.051*** 
 (5.31) (-12.55) (-17.97) (-0.55) (5.72) 
NOBS 916 916 916 788 782 
R-squared 0.133 0.291 0.516 0.034 0.228 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.981 1.000 
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Table 3.9 Multivariate Analysis (-2 years) 
Similar to Mian (2001), I separate the firms that are producing negative industry adjusted 
ROA for the last 2 years prior to CFO replacement. Propensity score matching is used to 
pick the same number of control firms as treatment firms. In the first stage, a logit 
regression was run in which an indicator variable (CFO change firm=1, otherwise=0) is 
used as dependent and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, 
market capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings are used as independent 
variables. In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned 
in Table 3.5. None of the proxies for the information environment is significant in post-
CFO turnover. The number of analysts following the firm increases synchronous trading 
of the firm’s stocks. Other independent variables are in line with the expected signs 
outlined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The power of the test is computed 
by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance Synchronicity 
Ln of no. 
of analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.008*** 0.04 (0.02) (0.13) 0.004*** 
 (3.20) (0.60) (-0.20) (-1.52) (2.79) 
Treatment 0.00 -0.119* (0.10) (0.03) 0.004*** 
 (1.28) (-1.65) (-1.41) (-0.32) (3.23) 
Post*Treatment -0.003 0.038 0.116 0.159 -0.001 
 (-0.81) (0.38) (1.07) (1.34) (-0.48) 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 0.00 0.107***    
 (0.74) (2.72)    
Insider holdings 0.00 -0.234** (0.20) 0.00 -0.003* 
 (1.02) (-2.10) (-1.61) (0.03) (-1.78) 
Institutional 
holdings -0.014*** 0.503*** 0.299** 0.260* -0.007*** 
 (-3.39) (4.34) (2.45) (1.84) (-3.26) 
Ln of market value -0.006*** 0.251*** 0.289*** -0.053** -0.002*** 
 (-6.13) (10.13) (13.71) (-2.12) (-5.13) 
ROA -0.021*** 0.707*** 0.20 0.324** -0.015*** 
 (-4.78) (5.90) (1.58) (2.20) (-6.51) 
SD of ROA 0.084*** 2.031*** (1.03) -1.311* 0.033*** 
 (3.94) (3.47) (-1.61) (-1.77) (2.92) 
Constant 0.171*** -6.398*** -6.790*** 0.998** 0.047*** 
 (10.70) (-14.68) (-17.48) (2.14) (6.52) 
R-squared 0.197 0.323 0.244 0.021 0.221 
OBS 1194 1194 1194 1038 1030 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.943 1.000 
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Table 3.10 Multivariate Analysis (-1 year) 
Similar to Mian (2001), I separate the firms that are producing negative industry adjusted 
ROA in the year prior to CFO replacement. Propensity score matching is used to pick the 
same number of control firms as treatment firms. In the first stage, a logit regression was 
run in which an indicator variable (CFO change firm=1, otherwise=0) is used as dependent 
and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, market capitalization, 
earnings, and volatility of earnings are used as independent variables. In the second stage, 
the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned in Table 3.5. None of the 
proxies for the information environment is significant in post-CFO turnover. Higher 
institutional ownership and bigger firms improve information environment by attracting 
more analysts and reducing their dispersion. Other independent variables are in line with 
the expected signs outlined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The power of the test 
is computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance Synchronicity 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.008*** 0.246*** -0.098** -0.116* -0.001 
 (3.56) (3.87) (-2.05) (-1.65) (-0.71) 
Treatment 0.004* -0.049 -0.019 0.010 0.001 
 (1.81) (-0.77) (-0.40) (0.15) (0.82) 
Post*Treatment -0.003 -0.110 0.082 0.105 0.003 
 (-1.17) (-1.23) (1.21) (1.06) (1.49) 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 0.001 0.033    
 (1.01) (0.98)    
Insider holdings 0.003 -0.093 -0.110 0.034 -0.004* 
 (0.77) (-0.93) (-1.42) (0.30) (-1.91) 
Institutional 
holdings -0.017*** 0.350*** 0.692*** 0.084 -0.010*** 
 (-4.94) (3.31) (8.86) (0.71) (-4.74) 
Ln of market value -0.005*** 0.288*** 0.345*** -0.009 -0.002*** 
 (-7.23) (13.88) (26.13) (-0.46) (-5.67) 
ROA -0.025*** 0.158 -0.490*** 0.538*** -0.005** 
 (-6.69) (1.40) (-5.68) (4.18) (-2.17) 
SD of ROA 0.046** -0.860 -0.010 -0.397 0.113*** 
 (2.47) (-1.55) (-0.02) (-0.62) (9.73) 
Constant 0.162*** -6.934*** -5.419*** 0.221 0.050*** 
 (13.15) (-18.74) (-21.66) (0.59) (7.65) 
OBS 1560 1560 1560 1378 1344 
R-squared 0.208 0.293 0.463 0.029 0.214 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
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Table 3.11 Multivariate Analysis for Internal CFO Appointment (All Firms)  
In this table, I report the effects for a promoted CFO on the firm’s information environment. 
Internal is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1, if the CFO is promoted, and 0, if 
the hired CFO is from outside. Both types of firms, good and distressed, are put together 
in this regression. Although post is significant under a couple of measures and internal is 
significant under synchronicity, their interaction is not significant under any measure of 
information environment.  Therefore, I cannot conclusively comment on the effect of 
internal appointments on a firm’s information environment. The effects of other variables 
are in line with the expected signs outlined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
power of the test is computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity Ln of no. of 
analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post -0.001 -0.045 -0.083* 0.039 0.002*   
 (-0.65) (-0.70) (-1.81) (0.77) (1.95) 
Internal 0.001 0.138** -0.015 -0.053 0.001 
 (0.48) (2.12) (-0.32) (-0.99) (0.96) 
Post*Internal  0.002 0.019 0.004 0.117 0.000 
  (0.67) (0.21) (0.06) (1.61) (-0.24)    
Ln of no. of analysts 0.003*** 0.04                   
  (3.66) (1.16)                   
Insider holdings -0.003 -0.275*** 0.143** -0.011 -0.003**  
 (-1.13) (-2.96) (2.13) (-0.15) (-2.51)    
Institutional holdings -0.022*** 0.485*** 0.817*** -0.079 -0.010*** 
 (-7.75) (4.55) (10.99) (-0.91) (-6.86)    
Ln of market value -0.007*** 0.217*** 0.347*** -0.023* -0.001*** 
 (-13.10) (11.4) (32.41) (-1.94) (-5.23)    
ROA -0.015*** 0.199 -0.640*** 0.393*** -0.027*** 
 (-3.66) (1.33) (-5.95) (3.16) (-12.31)    
SD of ROA 0.126*** -2.093*** -0.083 -0.975* 0.044*** 
 (6.87) (-3.03) (-0.17) (-1.65) (4.36) 
Constant 0.194*** -5.567*** -5.584*** 0.606** 0.034*** 
 (20.94) (-15.92) (-26.46) (2.54) (8.20) 
NOBS 1,611 1,611 1,611 1,454 1,429 
R-squared 0.341 0.280 0.536 0.021 0.317 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.9914 1.000 
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Table 3.12 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (All Firms)  
In this table, I show the CFO replacement effect for a newly hired CFO from external 
sources. External is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1, if the hired CFO is from 
outside, and 0, if the hired CFO has been promoted. Both types of firms, good and 
distressed, are put together in this regression. Although post is significant under 
synchronicity and external is significant under the number of analysts and forecast 
dispersion, their interaction is not significant.  Therefore, we cannot conclusively comment 
on the effect of CFO-type on a firm’s information environment. The effects of other 
variables are in line with the expected signs outlined in Table 4. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The power of the test is computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. 
(2007). 
 Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity 
Ln of no. of 
analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.002 0.154** -0.013 0.064 0.001 
 (1.45) (2.48) (-0.29) (1.29) (0.65) 
External 0.001 0.045 0.083* -0.039 -0.002*   
 (0.65) (0.70) (1.81) (-0.77) (-1.95)    
Post*External  -0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.116 0.000 
  (-0.64) (-0.15) (0.01) (-1.60) (0.28) 
Ln of no. of analysts 0.003*** 0.04                   
  (3.65) (1.16)                   
Insider holdings -0.003 -0.275*** 0.143** -0.011 -0.003**  
 (-1.12) (-2.96) (2.13) (-0.14) (-2.51)    
Institutional holdings -0.022*** 0.484*** 0.816*** -0.078 -0.010*** 
 (-7.75) (4.55) (10.99) (-0.90) (-6.85)    
Ln of market value -0.007*** 0.217*** 0.347*** -0.023* -0.001*** 
 (-13.10) (11.41) (32.42) (-1.94) (-5.22)    
ROA -0.015*** 0.199 -0.640*** 0.392*** -0.027*** 
 (-3.66) (1.32) (-5.95) (3.16) (-12.32)    
SD of ROA 0.126*** -2.095*** -0.084 -0.975* 0.044*** 
 (6.87) (-3.03) (-0.17) (-1.65) (4.35) 
Constant 0.193*** -5.616*** -5.669*** 0.644*** 0.036*** 
 (20.39) (-15.72) (-26.23) (2.63) (8.40) 
NOBS 1599 1599 1599 1454 1429 
R-squared 0.341 0.28 0.536 0.021 0.317 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.991 1.000 
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Table 3.13 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (-5 Years) 
I divide CFO class to see whether CFO hire within the firm or outside the firm affects the 
firm’s information environment differently, conditional on the fact that CFO change affects 
information environment (refer to Table 3.6). Propensity score matching is used to pick the 
same number of distressed and non-distressed firms. In the first stage, a logit regression 
was run in which an indicator variable (distressed firm=1 and sound firm=0) is used as 
dependent and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, market 
capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings risk are used as independent variables. 
In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned in Table 
3.5. As expected, CFO change from external source matters more. Bringing a CFO from 
outside significantly improves information environment (analysts’ forecast error is reduced 
significantly). The finding is consistent with Mian (2001). The power of the test is 
computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 
Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity 
Ln of no. 
of analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.003  0.070  (0.009) 0.086  (0.003) 
 (0.70) (0.58) (-0.09) (0.66) (-0.82)    
External (0.007) 0.147  (0.079) 0.098  (0.005) 
 (-1.44) (1.22) (-0.76) (0.76) (-1.36)    
Post*External  0.000  (0.014) (0.078) -0.371** 0.001  
  (-0.04) (-0.09) (-0.55) (-2.06) (0.180) 
Ln of no. of analysts 0.001  (0.016)                   
  (0.640) (-0.27)                   
Insider holdings (0.010) (0.086) 0.590*** -0.435** (0.003) 
 (-1.14) (-0.40) (3.25) (-2.27) (-0.57)    
Institutional holdings -0.035*** 0.685*** 0.753*** 0.041  -0.021*** 
 (-5.05) (3.910) (5.140) (0.210) (-3.89)    
Ln of market value -0.004** 0.267*** 0.377*** (0.041) (0.001) 
 (-2.30) (6.840) (13.540) (-1.11) (-1.13)    
ROA (0.011) 0.282  -0.533*** 0.588*** -0.029*** 
 (-1.46) (1.470) (-3.26) (2.690) (-5.20)    
SD of ROA 0.089*** -1.517* -1.608** 0.044  (0.002) 
 (2.600) (-1.75) (-2.16) (0.040) (-0.06)    
Distressed 0.009*** -0.251*** 0.069  (0.004) -0.005**  
 (2.660) (-2.99) (0.950) (-0.04) (-2.22)    
Constant 0.154*** -6.303*** -6.061*** 0.986  0.052*** 
 (5.560) (-8.99) (-11.58) (1.420) (2.930) 
NOBS 402 402 402 346 336 
R-squared 0.197 0.341 0.499 0.052 0.232 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.874 1.000 
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Table 3.14 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (-4 Years) 
I divide CFO class to see whether CFO hire within the firm or outside the firm affects the 
firm’s information environment differently, conditional on the fact that CFO change affects 
information environment (refer to Table 3.7). Propensity score matching is used to pick the 
same number of distressed and non-distressed firms. In the first stage, a logit regression 
was run in which an indicator variable (distressed firm=1, otherwise=0) is used as 
dependent and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, market 
capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings risk are used as independent variables. 
In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned in Table 
3.5. In order to capture any effect due just being “distressed,” I use the dummy variable 
distressed in the regression. Being only a distressed firm significantly increases market 
noise or idiosyncratic variance and reduces synchronicity. However, when a CFO is hired 
from an external source, the information environment (synchronicity) of the firm improves 
significantly. The finding is consistent with that of Mian (2001). The power of the test is 
computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et al. (2007). 
 Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity Ln of no. 
of analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.004  (0.051) -0.157* 0.023  0.005**  
 (1.230) (-0.54) (-1.89) (0.210) (2.170) 
External 0.000  0.042  (0.116) (0.053) 0.000  
 (-0.12) (0.440) (-1.39) (-0.49) (-0.04)    
Post*External  (0.005) 0.227* 0.126  (0.233) (0.005) 
  (-0.95) (1.74) (1.09) (-1.53) (-1.56)    
Ln of no. of analysts 0.004** 0.074                       
  (2.18) (1.63)                      
Insider holdings (0.001) (0.113) 0.291** (0.226) (0.002) 
 (-0.17) (-0.74) (2.18) (-1.29) (-0.66)    
Institutional holdings -0.031*** 0.661*** 0.596*** (0.141) -0.016*** 
 (-5.83) (4.720) (4.90) (-0.88) (-4.65)    
Ln of market value -0.004*** 0.229*** 0.381*** 0.011  -0.002**  
 (-3.13) (7.250) (16.350) (0.370) (-2.34)    
ROA -0.014** 0.282* -0.854*** 0.246  -0.026*** 
 (-2.28) (1.750) (-6.18) (1.320) (-6.44)    
SD of ROA 0.082*** (0.998) -1.306** (1.180) 0.034*   
 (3.12) (-1.46) (-2.17) (-1.24) (1.83) 
Distressed 0.005** -0.308*** 0.092  (0.017) (0.002) 
 (2.13) (-4.68) (1.59) (-0.23) (-1.00)    
Constant 0.147*** -5.709*** -6.053*** 0.096  0.050*** 
 (6.74) (-10.02) (-13.75) (0.17) (3.97) 
NOBS 632 632 632 538 530 
R-squared 0.166 0.323 0.437 0.031 0.258 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.837 1.000 
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Table 3.15 Multivariate Analysis for External CFO Appointment (-3 Years) 
I divide CFO class to see whether CFO hire within the firm or outside the firm affects firm's 
information environment differently, conditional on the fact that CFO change affects 
information environment (refer to Table 3.8). Propensity score matching is used to pick the 
same number of distressed and non-distressed firms. In the first stage, a logit regression 
was run in which an indicator variable (distressed firm=1, otherwise=0) is used as 
dependent and the number of analysts, insider holdings, institutional holdings, market 
capitalization, earnings, and volatility of earnings risk are used as independent variables. 
In the second stage, the same procedure was followed as previously mentioned in Table 
3.5. In order to capture any effect due to just being “distressed,” I use the dummy variable 
distressed in the regression. Being only a distressed firm significantly increases market 
noise or idiosyncratic variance and reduces synchronicity. However, when a CFO is hired 
from an external source, the information environment (synchronicity) of the firm improves: 
two information environment variables are significant. The finding is consistent with that 
of Mian (2001). The power of the test is computed by the G*Power 3 program by Faul et 
al. (2007). 
 Idiosyncratic 
variance 
Synchronicity Ln of no. 
of analysts 
Forecast 
errors 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Post 0.005* 0.088 -0.130* 0.067 -0.001    
 (1.82) (1.04) (-1.87) (0.75) (-0.38)    
External -0.000 0.023 -0.029 0.100 -0.004**  
 (-0.02) (0.27) (-0.42) (1.14) (-2.29)    
Post*External  -0.005 0.029 0.161* -0.319** 0.002    
  (-1.19) (0.25) (1.68) (-2.51) (0.95)    
Ln of no. of analysts 0.004*** 0.076*                    
  (2.73) (1.90)                    
Insider holdings -0.006 -0.136 0.232** -0.179 -0.006**  
 (-1.43) (-1.02) (2.10) (-1.24) (-2.29)    
Institutional holdings -0.027*** 0.344*** 0.751*** -0.204 -0.019*** 
 (-6.34) (2.62) (7.13) (-1.41) (-6.89)    
Ln of market value -0.006*** 0.223*** 0.366*** 0.060** -0.001**  
 (-6.27) (7.96) (18.64) (2.28) (-2.44)    
ROA -0.014*** 0.231 -0.770*** 0.232 -0.024*** 
 (-2.64) (1.45) (-5.95) (1.40) (-7.67)    
SD of ROA 0.058** -1.560** -0.297 -0.271 0.032**  
 (2.52) (-2.24) (-0.52) (-0.33) (2.33)    
Distressed 0.007*** -0.084 0.049 0.073 -0.001    
 (3.31) (-1.40) (0.98) (1.12) (-0.46)    
Constant 0.181*** -5.639*** -5.940*** -0.996** 0.047*** 
 (10.97) (-11.24) (-16.27) (-2.04) (5.21)    
NOBS 632 632 632 538 530 
R-squared 0.215 0.244 0.451 0.029 0.264 
Power of the test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.805 1.000 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
[Variables related to equity choice of a firm are taken from Chang et al. 2009 and 
Hovakimian et al. 2001]  
CFO turnover: an indicator variable. It takes a value of 1 if a firm experienced CFO 
turnover in the current year, otherwise 0. 
CEO turnovert-1: an indicator variable. It takes a value of 1 if a firm experienced CEO 
turnover in the previous year, otherwise 0. 
Return: it is defined as “ﬁrm’s buy-and-hold stock return for the period ending at the start 
of the ﬁscal year during which the departure takes place less the value-weighted 2-digit 
compounded monthly industry return over this same period (Fee and Hadlock 2004, p.14).” 
Ln of sales: natural log of annual sales 
F-score: it calculates the probability of restating earnings and is calculated following 
Dechow et al. (2011). 
Restatement: it is an indicator variable; takes a value of 1 if the firm restated earnings, 
otherwise 0. Restatement data is obtained from Audit Analytics. 
Year: it is a trend or time variable. The starting year, 2004 was subtracted from the current 
year. Thus, it can be from 0 (=2004-2004) to 11 (=2015-2004).  
Debt percent: Net debt issue/Beginning balance of assets= (Long Term Debt Issuance-
Long Term Debt Reduction+ Current Debt Changes)/TAt-1 
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Equity percent: Net equity issue/Beginning balance of assets= (Sale of Common and 
Preferred Stock- Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock)/TAt-1 
Internal CFO (INTERNAL): A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the hired CFO is 
promoted and has worked for the firm at least one year, 0 if the hired CFO worked for the 
company 0 year. The previous work experience of a CFO with the same company has been 
defined as the difference when his or her EXECID (executive ID) showed up in the 
EXECUCOMP dataset working for a firm and his or her appointment as a CFO. For new 
external hires, the year in which the ID first showed up and appointment year will be same, 
hence, the difference will be zero. In order to ensure that internal CFO has worked at least 
for one year for the appointing firm, I defined internal CFOs when year difference is greater 
than or equal to 2 (refer to Figure 2.1 for a graphical explanation). Title “CFO” includes, 
“chief financial officer,” “CFO,” “chief finance officer,” “sr. exec.-finance,” “vice 
president of finance,” “principal financial officer,” “chf. fin. Offr.,” “V-P-finance,” “VP-
finance,” “VP-strategy & finance,” “V-P-fin,” “exec. fin. offr.,” “sr. exec.-finance,” and 
excludes “interim chief financial officer” “acting chief finance officer” “former chief 
finance officer” in the Annual Title column of EXECUCOMP dataset.  
Industry CFO ratio: number of internal CFO appointments (excluding the sample firm) in 
a 2-digit SIC divided by the total number of firms in the industry in a year. It is used as 
an instrument.  
Firm governance: it is proxied by the entrenchment index or e-index which implies the 
alignment (agreement) between firm’s management and investors about the future payoffs 
of the projects. The index is calculated using Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009): 
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𝐸 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ∑ 𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
6
𝑖=1
 
Which says that E-index is a sum of six entrenchment provisions. For the presence of each 
provision a value of 1 is assigned and 0 for the absence of the provision. The six 
entrenchment provisions are, “staggered board: a board in which directors are divided into 
separate classes (typically three) with each class being elected to overlapping terms, 
limitation on amending bylaws: a provision limiting shareholders’ ability through majority 
vote to amend the corporate bylaws, limitation on amending the charter: a provision 
limiting shareholders’ ability through majority vote to amend the corporate charter, 
supermajority to approve a merger: a requirement that requires more than a majority of 
shareholders to approve a merger, golden parachute: a severance agreement that provides 
benefits to management/board members in the event of firing, demotion, or resignation 
following a change in control, and poison pill: a shareholder right that is triggered in the 
event of an unauthorized change in control that typically renders the target company 
financially unattractive or dilutes the voting power of the acquirer” Bebchuk et al. 2009. 
The index value ranges from 0 to 6; 0 being the absence of any entrenchment and 6 being 
high entrenchment toward investors. Highly entrenched firms have strong protection to 
remove or hold management accountable for their actions.  
Ln of assets: Natural log of book value of assets. 
Tangibility: Net PPE-to-Asset ratio. 
Leverage ratio: Total debt/ (total assets + market value of equity - book value of equity). 
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Market-to-Book ratio: (Total assets+ market value of equity- book value of equity)/ total 
assets. 
Finance size: Total financing needs/ total assets = (net debt issued + net equity issued)/ 
total assets. 
Share turnover: Median value of monthly shares traded (volume) divided by shares 
outstanding over a 12-month period. 
Ln of firm age: Natural log of year difference between the first year the firm entered into 
COMPUSTAT database and current fiscal year. 
Debt rating: Dummy variable if the firm has a debt rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Number of analyst: The maximum number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts at 
any month over a 12-month period. I assume firms that are not covered by I/B/E/S have 
zero analyst’s coverage (Chang et al., 2009). 
Volatility of earnings: Historical volatility using previous ten years of the ratio of EBITDA 
to total assets. 
Volatility of stock returns: Standard deviation of the daily stock return calculated for each 
firm for each year. 
Compounded stock return: Compounded annual stock returns over a twelve-month period. 
Industry leverage ratio: The median industry leverage ratio is computed as the median of 
the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets by the 3-digit SIC code and by year. 
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Number of analysts following: In previous research it is used as a control variable for 
information related dependent variables. I take the natural log of the number of analysts 
following because a small number of analysts follow small firms whereas a large number 
of analysts follow larger firms. 
Institutional Holdings: I extract the variables from Thompson Reuters of Wharton 
Database (13f, s34 dataset). The database has three types of holding: direct institutional 
holding, indirect institutional holding and total institutional holding as a percentage of total 
stock outstanding. I use total holding by institutions such as mutual funds and other 
professional investment or money managers. 
Insider Holdings: I extract the variables from Thompson Reuters of Wharton Database 
(TFN, Table #1 dataset). It includes stock holding by the employees of the organization. I 
put “CEO,” “COO,” “CFO,” “CB,” “O,” “D,” “VP,” and “P” as “rolecodes1” while 
extracting the data. It is defined as a percentage of total stock holdings. 
Market Capitalization: Market price of a stock multiplied by the total shares outstanding. 
I take the natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
Return on Assets (ROA): Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
Standard Deviation (SD) of ROA: Standard deviation of ROA is calculated using +/-12 
quarterly ROA (Brockman et al. 2009) surrounding the CFO change date. 
The following variables (used in calculation of F-score) are taken from Dechow et al. 
(2011) p.35-36: 
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RSST accruals: RSST (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna, 2005) accruals is calculated 
following Dechow et al. (2011). In their paper, it is calculated as, (∆WC + ∆NCO + ∆FIN)/ 
Average total assets, where WC = [Current Assets– Cash and Short-term Investments]–
[Current Liabilities – Debt in Current Liabilities ]; NCO = [Total Assets–Current Assets–
Investments and Advances ] – [Total Liabilities – Current Liabilities – Long-term Debt]. 
FIN= [Short-term Investments + Long-term Investments] – [Long-term Debt + Debt in 
Current Liabilities + Preferred Stock]. 
∆ in receivables: ∆Accounts Receivable/Average total assets. 
∆ in inventories: ∆Inventory/Average total assets. 
Soft assets: (Total Assets– PP&E–Cash and Cash Equivalent)/Total Assets. 
∆ in cash sales: Percentage change in cash sales: Sales–∆Accounts Receivable. 
∆ in ROA: [Earningst/Average total assetst] – [Earningst-1 /Average total assetst-1]. 
∆ in employees: Percentage change in the number of employees–percentage change in 
assets. 
Lease dummy: An indicator variable coded 1 if the future operating lease obligations are 
greater than zero, otherwise 0. 
Issue: An indicator variable. It takes a value of 1 if the firm either issues long-term debt or 
equity, otherwise 0. 
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